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In this thesis, I will argue that despite the many challenges faced by the 
Muslim power elites and the many well-documented problems of the Muslim 
community, the elites in reality, do have a lot of leverage over the community. I will 
set out to delineate some of the problems faced by both the Muslim community and 
the Muslim elites by analyzing three groups of Muslim elites 1) political elites, 2) 
social elites and 3) religious elites, and how they affect one another and locate all 
these within the larger context of Singapore society. Contemporary and classical 
theories are employed to map and critically examine the different configurations and 
permutations of the three groups of elites. My analysis will be dual in nature. Firstly, it 
will be at the level of inter-elites, wherein the relationships across the various elites 
are examined and secondly, at the level of intra-elites; looking at the tensions and 
conflicts within a specific group of elites. I will also contest the idea of the Singapore 
Muslim elites as a powerless entity which has been established in available literature. 
It must be impressed upon the reader that although this thesis focuses on the micro 
in the form of individuals and organizations, it is in the final analysis an attempt at 
making sense of the macro, the system and social order.  
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This thesis aims to explain aspects pertaining to the Muslim power elites in 
Singapore; its origins and characteristics. In our enthusiasm to look at the universal 
and the national to teach us something about the peculiar and the sectarian, we often 
miss the fact that the reverse could be as true. In fact due to the magnitude and 
sheer size of the national, it is easy to get oneself lost in the huge corpus of data and 
be overwhelmed by the literature that the debates have provoked. This thesis is 
hence an attempt to make sense of the national by looking at the minority in the hope 
that new light will be shed to enhance our understanding of the works already done. 
 
I will attempt to trace the “Malay Problem” throughout pre- and independent 
Singapore and the roles played by the Muslim elites. I will argue that despite the 
many problems faced by the Muslim power elites and the many well-documented 
problems of the Muslim community, the elites, do have a lot of leverage over the 
community. I will set out to delineate some of the problems faced by the Muslim 
community and the Muslim elites and how they affect one another and locate all 
these within the larger context of Singapore society. It must be impressed upon the 
reader that although this thesis focuses on individuals and organizations, it is in the 
final analysis an attempt at making sense of the system and social order.  
"Although sociology is defined as the science of societies, it cannot, in reality, deal with 
the human groups that are the immediate object of its investigation without eventually 
touching on the individual who is the basic element of which these groups are 
composed. For society can exist only if it penetrates the consciousness of individuals 
and fashions it in 'its image and resemblance'." (Durkheim, 1973:149) 
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It is important for us to understand elite formation amongst the Muslims in 
Singapore. This is needed for a number of reasons; the first being the dearth of 
studies done on elite formation in Singapore. A multi-faceted study that focuses on 
the minority is almost non-existent. Two works on the Malay elites stand out. One is 
Ismail Kassim’s Problems of Elite Cohesion: A Perspective from a Minority 
Community and the other, Sukmawati’s Trends in Malay Political Leadership: The 
People's Action Party's Malay Political Leaders and the Integration of the Singapore 
Malays. However, both have somewhat chosen to focus on the political elites, giving 
the false impression that the political elites are the only ones which hold power over 
the Muslim community in Singapore.  
 
I wish to present a more nuanced view of the power elites in Singapore. 
Power is widely distributed amongst the different groups of elites which include or 
represent the bulk of the Muslim population. In this sense, power is dispersed and not 
only top down. This very reason alone necessitates a study of this nature. A common 
perception of a top-down approach to a study of Singapore is that it represents the 
views and perspectives of the state. Although this study cannot claim to be bottom-up 
in nature, it attempts to decenter the state to include leaders of various and even rival 
organizations. It is important that this thesis decenters the state as much as possible 
in conceptualizing the society. 
 
The second reason is somewhat linked to the first one. Even if one attempts 
to derive and extract the nature of elite formation and their origins from the deluge of 
literature done on the Singapore political system, this will still prove to be inadequate. 
This is so, I will argue, because the case of the Muslim power elites in Singapore has 
with it certain peculiarities with regard to its formation when compared to the larger 
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national setup. Lastly, it is imperative for us to understand the intricacies of minority 
elite formation because it has a profound impact on the community at large. This will 
be further elaborated in the next few paragraphs. 
 
I will bring forth two hypotheses to be tested. The first is that variations in elite 
formation and functioning are decisive for certain major political outcomes. Most of 
the time, we jump straight into trying to explicate the different political situations. 
There has been a lot of debate with regard to the political culture of Singapore 
society, and amongst attempts at analyzing the Singapore political system include 
that of illiberal democracy, democratic socialism, communitarian, soft 
authoritarianism and authoritarianism. I will present in essence these propositions 
and will argue that in the case of the Muslim power elites, these approaches do not 
quite explain the social reality of Muslim leadership in Singapore. My argument is that 
if we were to trace the variations of how elites come into being in a particular society, 
this will give us an insight into the possible kinds of political outcomes. To 
demonstrate my case, I will examine the nature and ways in which these variations 
occur and the outcomes they shape. I will study the influence of these power elites 
and how entrenched or detached they are from the community at large. Hence, it 
becomes necessary to locate this microcosm within the larger political setting.  
 
Although elite structure and functioning determine many political outcomes, 
elites are in the final analysis not omnipotent. The second hypothesis is that, the 
relationship between the various members of the elites and between elites and the 
non-elite population is ultimately an interdependent one in which each category limits 
and shapes the actions that are open to the other. I will argue that it is precisely 
because of this factor that the cooptation pattern of the Muslim power elites has not 
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only reached a different degree, it has taken a different form. This could be down to 
two factors; the impact of the knowledge-based economy and the increase in 
influence of the religious elites. Through a study of a configuration of elites, I hope to 
provide a map of who has the power sharing a common ground with Mills in defining 
the elites in terms of institutional position. 
 
It makes sense to define the elites in terms of institutional position in the 
Singapore case as co-optation only takes place at a certain level in certain select 
organizations. Hence, from the upper echelons of the organization to the lower rungs, 
there is a power vacuum. There is hardly any regeneration. From a statist point of 
view, certain power elites are co-opted into this game as we will see from the 
example of Mendaki and MUIS. What is interesting to note is that this pool has since 
expanded to include other non-governmental social organizations. The upper 
echelons of the Singapore Muslim elites are now not only rotated between the seats 
of Mendaki, MUIS, the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC), the People’s Action 
Party (PAP), journalists and press editors, but have since expanded to include 
leaders from grassroots organizations like Muhammadiyah, PERDAUS and the 
Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP). If anything, we can now see a 
decentralization of power. This will be further explored in the third chapter. 
 
At this juncture, it is important to mention Peter Chen’s article on The Power 
Elites in Singapore (1978) as it is the only work ever done on the power elites in 
Singapore. He identified Singapore’s power elite as comprising of three groups: civil 
bureaucrats, a political elite and a select professional elite (Chen, 1978:13). The first 
two groups are more powerful than the third. The third group does not possess its 
own power base and consists of professionals who are co-opted from time to time to 
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support the political elite. Members of the professional elite only enter the core group 
if they are sponsored and co-opted by the political elite; they have no power to 
demand or negotiate entry within their own resources (Chen, 1978:13). Chen notes 
that the power elite that emerged in post-independent Singapore are a cohesive and 
homogenous group consisting of people known for their expertise and leadership 
ability. Its members are pro-development and interventionist within a capitalist 
framework. The core of this elite is small and it comprises of trade union leaders 
professionals and intellectuals. Although Chen views the power elite positively, he 
cautions that because development planning usually comes from the top as 
directives, there is a danger that the masses can become alienated from the power 
elite. He further warns that the expansion of government activities can result in the 
emergence of elite members wielding enormous power without accountability. This 
will in turn threaten democracy unless Singapore continues to have a popularly 
elected political elite that is strong enough to control the civil bureaucrats. 
 
He claimed that only a third of the political elites count as power elites (Chen, 
1978:12) which does not take into account almost all the Muslim political elites in 
Singapore. In this sense, using the term power elites in the context of the Muslim 
elites becomes subversive and controversial. It becomes even paradoxical and 
oxymoronic; that of a powerless power elite. This phenomenon will be scrutinized 
with more depth particularly in the final chapter. 
 
In the next few parts of this chapter, I will unpack the words “power” and 
“elites”. I will in turn discuss what it means to be in Singapore by focusing on its 
socio-political culture in order to finally position the Singapore Muslim elites within the 
milieu of available literature. 
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Talking about Power 
Bertrand Russell said that societies differ in many ways in relation to power. 
The first difference is in the degree of power possessed by individuals or 
organizations. They also differ as to the kind of organization that is the most powerful. 
Different forms of power structure, for example a theocracy, a plutocracy or a military 
despotism will obviously give rise to certain types of organizations becoming 
significant. Lastly, societies differ in the ways one acquires power. It may be 
hereditary, ecclesiastical, voted through democratic means or usurped through war 
(Russell, 1975:12). 
 
Foucault postulates that in fields of specialized knowledge, people’s actions 
are governed by the constituents of the power structures themselves. For example if 
we take Islam in Singapore as a field of specialized knowledge, one cannot 
understand the field without first understanding the power structures that govern the 
Muslims. One must first understand the nature of the organizations and the socio-
political culture that they are born into as part of the country they are situated in. 
These fields of knowledge are in turn manufactured within their discourses. Power is 
tied to discourses which are situated amongst a cacophony of social practices and 
situations. 
“Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any 
more than silences are. We must make allowance for the concept’s complex and 
unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, 
but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an 
opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also 
undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it 
(Foucault 1980, emphasis added).” 
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Here, we see the fragile and volatile nature of power. It can be contested and 
resisted. However, it is almost the consolidated view that by the powerful, we mean 
those who are able to realize their will, even if others resist it. Hence no one can be 
truly powerful unless he presides over and has command over major institutions 
(Mills, 1959:9). One cannot escape the hierarchical nature of power. For, it is control 
over these institutional means of power that the truly powerful are, in the first 
instance, powerful. Power elites make use of societal institutions to maintain and 
perpetuate political growth and to garner widespread social consent for it. Such 
actions which were carried out in their own interest only had to look as if they were 
initiated for the sake of the common good. This might, or might not, have been the 
case, but it was sufficient that both the elites and the people were predisposed to 
believe it (Machiavelli, 1947; Reinhard, 1996:15). 
 
Theories of Elites in Society 
 I understand that elite theories are not without their shortcomings. However, I 
will argue that despite these, the utilization of elite theories as a searchlight to 
illuminate this particular study will prove more than useful. Although Mills is the 
starting point of enquiry into this thesis, I wish to travel both into classical and 
contemporary elite theories to draw useful conceptual tools to analyze the data at 
hand. 
 
To do this, we must free our minds of all preconceived ideas of the power 
elite. And this is a liberation that can be achieved through an "argument by 
elimination". It is indeed fitting, Durkheim suggested, "to examine some of the most 
current of the definitions in which these prejudices are commonly expressed, before 
taking up the question on our own account." We must scrutinize the various elite 
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systems we know and the theories that advance and map them, in order to determine 
those elements which they have in common; for the power elites cannot be defined 
except by the characteristics which are found wherever the power elite itself is found. 
 
Vilfredo Pareto in The Rise and Fall of the Elites sought to identify the major 
features of society that fluctuate cyclically, to describe the movement of these cycles 
in equilibrium terms and to indicate ways in which the structural features and general 
form of society emerge from the equilibrium being described. He was of the view that 
the three societal properties which form the most important features of social systems 
are public sentiments, economic interests, and the circulation of political elites. All 
three components fluctuate cyclically. Movement on one cycle is correlated with 
movement on the others. Depending on a society’s position on these coordinated 
cycles, a different set of structural properties will emerge. The character of each 
society changes as it moves along these three equilibrated cycles (Pareto, 
1939:2254). He argued that the governing class is not a homogenous body. 
Sometimes the fact is visible to the eye, at other times it is more or less hidden from 
view. It gives rise to his theory of the “circulation of elites”. The goal of sociology, so 
to speak, is to understand the equilibrium dynamics that produce social change and 
give it a predictable character. 
 
Pareto posits that every human being is motivated by sentiments-
subconscious beliefs that serve as standards of evaluation. The most important 
sentiments are combinations-cunning, guile, and inclination to innovate- and 
persistence of aggregates- adherence to established ways and an insistence on the 
preservation of traditions. He argued that individuals are governed by a mixture of 
both sentiments but every individual is dominated by one more than the other. The 
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governing elite composed of two kinds of people. Those dominated by the sentiment 
of “combination” prefer to rule through co-optation, diplomatic intrigue, and 
deviousness. Those dominated by the “persistence of aggregates” are direct and 
prefer to rule through the use of unbridled force. Since the use of legitimate violence 
is the sole abode of the state, according to Weber, it is not a luxury at the disposal of 
the elites outside the state circles. Pareto in Machiavellian fashion, referred to these 
two types of leaders as foxes and lions, respectively. If the governing elites are to 
stay in power, heterogeneity is essential in defending its privileged status. It is this 
ability of the governing elites in Singapore, their ability to exercise control through a 
combination of co-optation and force that has marked the rule of Singapore post-
independence. 
 
If we were to look at society as a whole, Pareto was of the view that 
aggregate patterns of sentiment change over time. History is marked by some 
periods when blind adherence to tradition was encouraged and other periods when 
guile and innovation were advanced. Thus, the popular sentiments that characterize 
a society undulate, moving through successive cycles of “faith” and “skepticism”. 
However, I will argue in this thesis that this analysis of society is not accurate of the 
time that we live in today. History is at a crossroads. We are living in a time of “faith” 
and “skepticism”. Contextualized to the Muslims in Singapore, the situation is made 
even more complicated by what is perceived as increasing religiosity amongst the 
Muslims living in a larger secularized society. Pareto’s analysis of society as a 
system of interrelated parts in equilibrium is not unlike the position taken by the 
Singapore state. So as not to upset the social fabric and economic stability of the 
country, things have to remain at equilibrium. However, equilibrium must not be 
misunderstood to mean an equal proportion of all its components. 
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C Wright Mills in The Power Elite observed that the changes in the power 
system of the United States have not involved important challenges to its basic 
legitimacy. Nor have they involved in any decisive way, any ideological struggle to 
control the masses. We will see that in the Singapore context, this is at best partially 
true. He posits that we need to dispel ourselves of the myth of democratic checks on 
power. Mills, in an apparent departure from Pareto argues forcefully that America is 
not governed by a heterogeneous power elite, but a homogenous one which makes 
up three dominant groups: leaders of big corporations, the military establishment and 
the top civil servants. C Wright Mills postulates that the governing elite in the United 
States comes from three distinct categories; the select group of political leaders 
including the Presidents and a few key close advisors and cabinet members, major 
corporate owners and directors, and the top-ranking military officers. The power elite 
is hence defined as comprising of men…in positions to make decisions having major 
consequences...They are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of 
modern society (Mills, 1959:3-4). With respect to the Muslim power elites in 
Singapore, the analysis made by Pareto with regard to the heterogeneity of the elites 
better describes the plurality and diversity of the Singapore Muslim elites. 
 
One can find elites in every society. To study the elites at the micro level, we 
have to first assume that human beings act according to their interest- be it rational, 
pseudo-rational, or irrational choice- and that this interest has an elementary 
character and therefore needs no substantiation because it is self-explanatory 
(Reinhard, 1996:5). Some scholars (Meissel, 1958 and Bottomore, 1964) assume 
that elites are necessarily characterized by “three Cs”- group consciousness, 
cohesion, and conspiracy. Rousseau also observed that the holders of power in a 
state did not only develop their own interests, but also a specific group-
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consciousness based on these common interests. One particular aspect of elite 
theories stands out. In a blatant critique of Rousseau, the theories are consolidated in 
saying that the government might be for the people, but never by the people (Mauzy 
and Milne, 2002:53). 
 
‘Ruling classes’ can be defined according to Karl Marx as the owners of the 
means of production or the holders of economic power in a given society. In the 
earlier centuries, this position was to a large extent based on socio-political status 
and not vice-versa. Feudal lordship over land, especially when combined with noble 
birth, was an even better qualification to gain membership into the ruling class than 
wealth of bourgeois origin.  
 
Therefore, Gaetano Mosca’s theory of general antagonism between rulers 
and ruled, which is present in any society, appears to be more appropriate in our 
case. The ruling classes did not rule because they were rich, but they were rich 
because they ruled. They decided what the common good was, and their consent 
was necessary for the successful political action of power elites. I wish to distance 
myself from this definition of the power elites as the rich. I will further elaborate on 
this matter at a later juncture. 
 
Certainly interesting to the Singapore case, Mosca observed firstly, that all 
ruling classes tend to become heredity- in fact if not in law. Even where entrance into 
positions of authority are determined by open qualification, more often than not, only 
those privileged with the proper kinship ties, wealth, influences and resources, for 
example “connections”, or high education are in the end able to gain entry into such 
fields. Secondly, these groups in power will tend to establish a formal hereditary 
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basis of power through appeal to such authorities as supernatural origins which in 
later times will manifest itself through scientific trappings such as superiority due to 
social evolution. 
 
Mosca challenges the validity of a heredity basis for maintenance of power as 
inconsistent with a few factors. How does one then explain the decline and loss of 
power of a ruling class? Also, based on the social evolutionary theory, descendants 
of rulers should become increasingly better rulers, which is rarely the case. In reality, 
shifts in power occur from developments such as a new source of wealth, changes in 
the practical importance of knowledge or the rise of a new religion. Ruling classes will 
decline when they cease to find scope for the capacities through which they rose to 
power, or when the talents and services they render lose their importance in the 
social environment. It could happen by means of commerce and exchange of ideas 
with foreign peoples, a slow process of internal growth or conquest by foreign 
invasions. Ruling classes are eventually overcome by the advent of new social 
elements that are strong in fresh political forces. Hence, a new social group will work 
its way to the top of the social ladder and gradually acquire group solidarity and a 
monopoly on power - a monopoly they will seek to maintain by attempts to establish a 
heredity basis of rule. I will get back to this in the last chapter. Through traversing a 
sociology of the Muslims in Singapore, through discussing the tudung and casino 
issues, the madrasahs and Muslims in the National Service, I hope to map out the 
main fault lines along which there exist deep-seated divisions and differences in 





Singapore Political System 
It thus becomes imperative to locate the Singapore Muslim power elites within 
the larger setting of the Singapore socio-political system. To understand the role of 
power elites in their respective societies we must be aware of the social, legal, 
political, and institutional framework in which they developed, acted, and played their 
part in the process of the formation of the modern state (Bulst, 1996:41). 
 
Much ground has been traversed in this area in trying to make sense of the 
social order, describing and situating Singapore at various positions of the 
conservative-liberal linear scale. The Singapore socio-political system has been 
called almost everything from a parliamentary democracy, a socialist democracy, soft 
authoritarian, communitarian, corporatist, Confucianist, administrative state right 
down to an authoritarian style of governance. All these explanations come with their 
own assumptions on elite emergence and their roles in society. It is my contention 
that as diverse as the rhetoric is with regard to the Singapore political system, it does 
not quite explain the emergence of the Muslim power elites and explain their 
functions. The case of the Singapore Muslim power elites is an anomaly, exclusive 
unto itself. However, the need remains to weave the Singapore Muslim power elites 
into the intellectual space already demarcated by these authors.  
 
Chan (1975) argues that in the early 1960s, the PAP leadership engaged in a 
process of systematically depoliticizing a politically active and aggressive citizenry. 
This process also involved the subtle expansion of the bureaucratic and 
administrative sector into the realm of public-policy making. Its effectiveness is 
reflected in the fact that, by the end of the 60s, Singapore was transformed from a 
volatile polity into a stable administrative state. Chan observed that in an 
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administrative state, politics took place primarily through newspapers columns, 
rumour-mongering mills and the centralized system of government institutions. 
 
The PAP ever since its victory in the 1959 elections has claimed a mandate to 
govern through the establishment of a parliamentary democracy (Tae, 1970:466). 
Sikorski suggested that Singapore’s approach to democracy can be described as 
top-down. Senior Minister Goh said that Singapore is a democracy, but 'not a liberal 
democracy like in Britain or in the US' (Straits Times, 16 March 2005). However, 
according to Mauzy and Milne (2002), there are undeniable authoritarian aspects of 
the Singapore government which includes draconian laws, control on political 
participation, and measures limiting civil and political rights and freedom of the press 
(Mauzy and Milne, 2002:128).  
  
Catherine Jones (1993) argued that Singapore society, being predominantly 
Chinese, rates as a Confucian society. She makes a reference to popular 
Confucianism, its sets of common precepts, values, and prohibitions. Habibullah 
Khan (2001) noted that one cannot ignore the importance of culture and tradition in 
affecting the process of socialization. Interventionist strategies, he claimed, tend to 
work well in a Confucian society characterized by altruism and close family ties. It 
leads to a remarkable degree of social conformism which can be attributed to the 
paternalistic attitude of the government. Although in some countries where a single 
race or group can be identified as the majority, the values and ideals of that particular 
race “may form the basis of the national values… (and) the minority group or race 
would seek to integrate their values” (Lau, 1974:1). This argument is very much 
contested in Singapore. Firstly, the state itself has moved away from this discourse 
stating that multiracialism and meritocracy form the cornerstone of nation-building. 
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Secondly, it is also very dubious as to how much Singaporeans themselves, even 
amongst the Chinese majority; take this notion of Confucianism seriously. Hence, to 
claim the very formation and origin of the Muslim elites in Singapore to be Confucian 
in nature will be stretching it too far to say the least. 
 
In a Confucianist society, seniority brings its just rewards with advancement 
up the hierarchy. Thus the individual’s position is forever evolving, not static. 
However, this evolution is cast within a collective setup since it is the group that 
matters and not the individual. There is a place for everyone and everyone should 
know his or her place and behave accordingly. Intrinsic is the Confucian conception 
of good government by “honourable men” (junzi). The elites set themselves up as the 
model of a moral leadership which governs in the interest of the people rather than 
through self-interest. Here, we run into a theoretical problem. In an almost Hegelian 
fashion, we are forced to assume the state as containing an elite who knows "the 
truth" without regard for "the people" and to affirm the subjugation of "culturally 
inferior" subjects to their "superiors." 
 
This conception of the elites forces us to prejudge by definition that which we 
ought to leave open for investigation. The elite conceived morally as people having a 
certain type of character is not an ultimate definition, for apart from being rather 
morally arbitrary, it leads us immediately to ask why these people have this or that 
sort of character. Accordingly, we should leave open the type of characters which the 
members of the elite in fact turn out to have, rather than by definition select them in 
terms of one type or another (Mills, 1959:366-367). 
 
 16 
Denny Roy (1994) in borrowing concepts advanced by Francis Fukuyama 
posits that the model that best describe Singapore is one of “soft authoritarianism”. 
Two features make up the distinguishing factors in this model. First, it combines a 
market-oriented economic system with “a kind of paternalistic authoritarianism that 
persuades rather than coerces.” What results, is a regime that is economically liberal 
but politically quasi-authoritarian. Second, soft authoritarianism is communitarian, 
“emphasizing conformity to group interests over individual rights.” In Singapore, soft 
authoritarianism manifests itself in the influence of Confucian values that champion 
order, a strong but moral state, and the needs of society as a whole over personal 
freedoms and limitations on government. 
 
Chua was of the point of view that the second generation PAP government 
had begun to shed some of the authoritarian strictures of their predecessors and 
intensify the rhetoric of participation. The overall effect of the institutional changes is 
to cultivate a political “middle ground” which potentially augurs well for further political 
democratization. However, the formal democratic processes are to be framed within 
a “communitarian” ideology; itself an evolution from earlier concepts of Confucianism 
and the so-called “collectivism” of Asian traditions (Chua, 1995:7) which the state 
deems as absolutely fundamental to national security and continuous economic 
growth. 
 
 In Asia, formal democratic processes are accompanied by strong 
authoritarian features. Ottaway argued that this puts countries such as Pakistan, 
Singapore and Malaysia in the realm of semi-authoritarianism (Ottaway, 2003:4). She 
alleged that all governments can win a measure of genuine public support by 
delivering public services and stimulating economic growth. She cites Singapore as 
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an example of a semi-authoritarian regime which has garnered much success in 
running a well-administered country with a strong economy (Ottaway, 2003:143).  
 
Of all the theories, the analysis made by Olcott and Ottaway proves most 
useful in analyzing the case of Singapore society. They observed that in a soft 
authoritarian system, elite formation is characterized by “the existence and 
persistence of mechanisms that effectively prevent the transfer of power through 
elections from the hands of the incumbent leaders or party to a new political elite or 
political organization” (Olcott and Ottaway, 1999). These mechanisms thrive despite 
the country adopting formal democratic institutions and despite the existence of a 
degree of political freedom granted to the citizens of that particular country. In a soft 
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian system, the regime may allow for autonomous 
organizations of civil society to function, for private business to flourish, and even 
allow for new economic elites to come up. The regime may hold fairly open elections 
or even allow their backbenchers to be defeated in an election. However, debate over 
the nature of political power in society, where it resides, and who should hold it is 
very much contained. But most importantly, membership in the core power elites is 
not determined by election. At the core, competition is a myth; even if elections are 
held, the powers of the incumbents are not truly allowed to be challenged by the 
outsiders. The reasons why these regimes cannot be considered democratic are 
dual. They lack the critical characteristic democratic systems rest on because firstly, 
elections do not represent the source of the regime’s power and secondly, as a 
result, voters cannot relocate power to a new leadership. Olcott and Ottaway argued 
that if elections do not present a possibility for the alternation of elites, the country 
cannot be termed a democracy. However, such regimes cannot also be categorized 
as purely authoritarian because there exist a certain degree of openness in the 
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political process and also due to the fact that they accept at least partial challenges 
and allow a degree of freedom for competing organizations. 
 
All these systems are not without their assumptions with regard to elite 
formation. Mosca argued that the varying structure of ruling classes has a 
preponderant importance in not only determining the political type but also the level 
of civilization of the different peoples (Mosca, 1939:51). It is my contention that all 
these conceptual frameworks in thinking about the Singapore socio-political system, 
in the final analysis do not quite capture the coming into being of the Muslim power 
elites. It is anomalous even within the broader scheme of the country’s national 
power elites. There are peculiarities inherent in the formation and function of the 
Muslim elite. Not only that, this reverberates into the struggles that the elites are 
faced with over the community. 
 
Theoretical Framework: Carving Out the Muslim Power Elites in Singapore 
Although the work of Mills is critical to this study, I will move away from his 
conception of the power elites as those elites who are in the political, economic and 
military circles which as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share decisions having 
national consequences. The reason for this is neither analytical nor theoretical. It is 
empirical. A peculiarity when it comes to studying the Muslims in Singapore is that 
the military route to power elitism as in Mill’s definition is closed. And there is no 
evidence of any Muslim economic elites forming collaborations or alliances with the 
military and political elites.  
 
One needs to contextualize the concept to the local empirical field. As such, I 
have done away with Mills’ understanding of the power elites as coming from the 
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military and business sectors and replaced them with the social and religious elites. 
In line with the first hypothesis, I will then examine the variations in elite formation 
and functioning between the political, social and religious elites. 
 
Mills speaks of “the big decisions” as in so far as national events are decided; 
the power elite are those who decide them (Mills, 1959:18). When it comes to making 
“the big decisions” which affect the Muslims at a national level, it is easy for one to 
assume that the religious and social elite, those who are not linked to governmental 
institutions, play little or no part in the final outcome. This is not a true painting of 
social reality. Although the social and religious elites, unlike the political elites, do not 
rule directly, they have a massive influence over the community. A significant number 
of the Muslim community are members of these social organizations. Some, even if 
they are not members, partake in the organizations’ activities. The extensive social 
services rendered by these organizations, ranging from health care to welfare homes 
to educational services ensure that a significant number of the Muslim population has 
had or are still maintaining some kind of links with these social organizations.  
 
I share with Mills, however, the definition of the power elites as the heads of 
their respective institutions. The Muslim social elites are leaders of non-governmental 
grassroots organizations. And with the call amongst Singaporeans for a more open 
society and for the space for civil society to be widened, the social elites are playing a 
more critical role in society. I have included the social elites due to their rootedness in 
society and due to the fact that they not only consist of but also represent a 
significant proportion of the Muslim society in Singapore. The religious elites are a 
more ambiguous and contentious category. I will discuss this further in Chapter 3. 
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With the increasing religiosity amongst Muslims in Singapore, the role and impact of 
the religious elites cannot be discounted. 
 
The religious elites, by virtue of their regular sermons and religious classes 
have a huge leverage over the community. This can be argued to be one of the 
primary factors that contribute to the significant increase in religiosity amongst the 
Muslims in Singapore (Tan, 2004; Noor Aisha, 2006; Mukhlis, 2006). The fact that the 
political elites have to consider the sentiments on the ground in order to maintain a 
legal-rational form of legitimacy, gives rise to the second hypothesis that the 
relationship between the various members of the elites and between elites and non-
elite population is an interdependent one, each limiting and shaping the actions that 
are open to the other. The political elites, in order to maintain power then has to 
utilize a mixture of the fox and lion approach and take notice of the vibes and signals 
sent out by society at large. Hence, Pareto’s understanding of the ruling elite as a 
heterogeneous entity proves useful in the case of the Singapore Muslim elites as 
opposed to Mill’s conception of the power elite as a homogenous one. I will also 
utilize Pareto’s concept that for there to exist equilibrium in society, three important 
features of the social system needs to be examined; public sentiments, economic 
interests and the circulation of elites.  
 
I will extend Mosca’s argument here and argue the case that although a 
purely heredity (genetic) basis of maintenance of power is untenable; one can still 
make a case for heredity to mean the same groups or kinds of people. People who 
are similar with more or less the same social capital. This will be evident in the 
section on Berita Harian in Chapter 3. 
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There is a conscious reason as to why, in this thesis, I have chosen to 
disentangle the Malay/Muslim “truism” that is commonly used in the Singapore 
context and have chosen to focus on the Muslim aspect. What can be starkly noticed 
today is the shift of focus from the cultural aspects of the Malays to that of religion 
(Tan, 2004:85-88). Debates on the lazy native and the cultural deficit thesis have 
given way to the new fixation on religious moderation. From moribund and indolent 
attitudes, a crutch mentality trapped in a colonial captive mind resulting in slack 
educational attainments and low-paying jobs to that of religious extremism, 
fundamentalism and terrorism. Even though a lot of the debates amongst Muslims in 
Singapore are colored by and centered on identity politics (Barnard, 2004; Mazreeta, 
1997; Gomes 1994; Stimpfl, 1990 and Mohd Aris 1983) and the dichotomy between 
the seemingly bipolar social categories of Malay and Islam, I will cut through this 
debate to avoid excluding Muslims from other ethnic groups. 
 
Brief history of the Muslim Power Elites in Singapore 
One must recognize that in dealing with the Muslim power elites in Singapore, 
resources for status attainment vary with social group and historical era. Nonetheless 
one can still see certain parallels between past and present. Initially the Malay elite 
was an elite of birth (Mosca, 1939) though recruitment into the ranks of the political 
and the bureaucratic elites has undergone gradual change with an emphasis on 
talent. 
 
 It became apparent since the turn of the 20th century, that there was a 
growing realization amongst the Muslims in Singapore of an identity inspired in part 
by Islamic reformist ideas from the Middle East, but also in part arising from changes 
within the community itself (Soenarno, 1960:5). Freed from the influence of a 
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traditional aristocratic social structure, and living within an open, commercially 
vibrant, urban metropolis- “an important breeding ground for new ideas and new 
ways”- the Singapore Malay/Muslim community, even though the only minority Malay 
community in the Malay world, enjoyed a liberality that was not as easily available to 
their kith and kin on the Malay Peninsula (Roff, 1967:32). As social mobility was no 
longer tied to aristocratic privilege but dependent on religious piety and wealth, a 
small proportion of Arab Muslims1, who were highly respected for their religious 
learning and commercial acumen, and Jawi Peranakan2, who were prominent in 
Malay journalism, were able to rise to positions of community leadership and to 
exercise an influence that far outweighed their demographic status. “Malay 
journalism, like book publications in Malay, owes its origins very largely to locally 
born Indian Muslims in Singapore or, to be more exact, to the community known as 
‘Jawi Peranakan’” (Roff, 1967:40,48). 
 
Tham, in delineating occupational patterns amongst the Malays between 
1881 and 1921 posits that in traditional Malay society, there was no recognizable 
entrepreneurial class. He also observed that a bureaucratic class also emerged much 
later. The inchoate religious elites were members of the aristocracy and they were 
not a cohesively integrated group structurally. These religious elites were united by 





                                                 
1
 In the census of 1901, there were only 919 Arabs in Singapore 
2




This thesis will adopt both the qualitative and quantitative method of enquiry. I 
will attempt to do this by combining ethnographic description and a theoretical 
argument. For the purpose of the research, in depth interviews lasting an average of 
two hours were conducted with various elites from diverse fields. Some of the 
interviews were conducted in the offices of the elites themselves and others at 
various locations as specified by the elites. 
 
The problem that I encounter is one faced when a researcher interviews 
highly intelligent subjects. Firstly, not only is the researcher sizing the subject up, 
studying him or her, the subject is also sizing up the researcher, profiling him, trying 
to figure out the researcher’s politics. As such, it is not excessive if one were to 
question the validity of the data gathered. Was what said, said for the consumption of 
the researcher and the public at large or is there more than meets the eye? 
 
Secondly, as an extension, the subjects almost all the time will analyze the 
data for the researcher. Hence, the challenge for the researcher remains to excavate 
the various layers and get at the raw, the elementary forms. The researcher has to 
renounce the temptation of indulging in terminal truths and must not allow himself to 
be swayed by the power of rhetoric or perceived knowledge of the subject. The test 
remains to extract the data in its most elementary and raw form rather than data 
which has been coated for the consumption of others. 
 
Thirdly, due to the sensitivity of the issues discussed, the identities of the 
elites interviewed have to be kept anonymous. Even the promise of anonymity at 
times proves insufficient. Not only do the subjects refuse to comment on certain 
 24 
issues claiming “You know I can’t say because of my position”, others simply 
declined to be interviewed and some simply did not respond to requests for 
interviews. There are a number of occasions during the course of interviews 
conducted whereby the Muslim elites of prominent organizations merely refuse to 
comment on certain issues brought forth to them. They plead understanding as they 
claim that they are unable to comment based on their position. The disciplinary 
mechanisms that constrain them do not allow them to freely voice their concerns 
about certain issues. 
 
During the course of the study, it was observed that elites from the social and 
religious domains were more forthcoming to overtures for meetings and discussions. 
It was also observed that these elites were more obliging in their views after they 
have left office. They were more than willing to express their frustrations. This finding 
further complicates the culture of fear thesis (Glassner, 1999; Furedi, 1997). It shows 
that when it comes to the elites, the so-called “culture of fear” only exists whilst they 
were in office. From fieldwork experience, it was observed that the elites are more 
willing to open up to the researcher once the respective posts have been 
relinquished. 
 
The aim of the thesis is to get at what is constitutive as that is ultimately, the 
action that divides these power elites i.e. along what lines have they been drawn, and 
not the science that has evolved and has been elaborated as an afterthought once 
these divisions have already been made. In this chapter, I have discussed available 
literature on the elites in Singapore. I have also presented available theories of elites 
in society and from that, extract a theoretical framework for this thesis. Moreover, by 
summarizing the various views of the political culture in Singapore, it also enhances 
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our understanding of the external structures that weigh upon the Muslim power elites. 
And from these, I have carved out and defined the Muslim power elites and come up 
with a suitable methodology for the project. 
 
In Chapter 2, I will seek to locate the Muslim power elites within the Muslim 
community in Singapore. Giving a historical perspective spanning Singapore’s 
independence till today, I will argue that the Muslims in Singapore are distinguishable 
and has been somewhat characterized rightly or wrongly by the notion of the “Malay 
Problem”. I will problematize this notion as it is within this discourse that the 
Singapore Muslim power elites of today emerge. 
 
In Chapter 3, I will trace the variations in elite structures between the social, 
religious and political elites. The chapter will critically examine the relationships inter 
elites, between the different sets of elites and also intra elites, within a single 
category of elites. Chapter 4 will look at some impediments towards the Muslim 
community being wholly integrated in Singapore and cohesion amongst members of 
its elite groups. The final chapter will contextualize the Muslim elites within the larger 
Singapore society and analyze the perceived sense of powerlessness amongst the 
Muslim elites in Singapore. I will contest the idea of the Muslim power elites as a 
powerless entity. Although this has not been explicitly claimed, available literature as 




The aim of this chapter is to contextualize the Muslim elites within the 
empirical field. I will also set out to show that in the past few decades, the Muslim 
elites; social, political and religious have played a major role in shaping the fate of the 
Muslim community. It is indeed necessary to critically analyze and understand the 
“Malay Problem”, as it is within this context that the Muslim elites of today emerged. 
  
In this chapter, I will conflate the two categories of “Malay” and “Muslim”. 
Since the Malays make up 93% of the Muslim population in Singapore, it is not far-
fetched to surmise that the “Malay Problem” is the problem of the Muslim community. 
There is also a vast amount of literature that talks about how the small minority of 
Muslims becomes integrated and assimilated into Malay life; its traditions and culture. 
I will go back to the intricacies of conflating these two categories in Chapter 3. 
Moreover, in understanding the Muslim power elites, it is paramount that one 
comprehends the problems of the local Muslim community as it is against these that 
the elites are located and dislocated from. 
 
The Problem with the “Malay Problem”: Thinking with Emile Durkheim 
A lot has been said over the past few decades with regard to the “Malay 
Problem” and this talk of the “Malay Problem” has been a feature of Singapore 
politics ever since its early inception. In fact, the “Malay Problem” has been a 
discourse dominated and sustained by the elites. I will attempt to look at the issue of 
the “Malay Problem” through the lenses of Emile Durkheim and deploy the intellectual 
tools that he has delineated. I will argue that the Malay/Muslims are characterized by 
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a society that is experiencing a transition from a mechanical form of solidarity to an 
organic solidarity which already governs the rest of highly industrialized capitalist 
Singapore. This tension between the Malay/Muslims and the larger society has led to 
a deregulation amongst a portion of the Malay/Muslims, slipping into anomie which 
manifests itself in social problems. It will locate the failure of the Malay/Muslims to 
integrate into the larger social setting due to their rejection of secular English 
education; at least during the formative years of Singapore’s infancy. Finally, I will 
argue that the “problem” of the Malays does not necessarily need to be seen as 
pathological. It is normal and has a function to play in the moral formation of social 
life in Singapore. Not only that, the portrayal of the Malay situation as a problem and 
as being a deviant facet of Singaporean life benefits the state and the society at 
large. 
 
The Malay/Muslims, specifically those in Singapore, are a people caught in 
between, exposed and vulnerable to problems of transition. A former PAP political 
member (1980-91), who was also the President of Singapore Malay Teachers' Union 
(KGMS) from 1977 to 1979, has gone as far as calling the Malays the most “ill-
equipped and depressed (minority) community in a modernizing Singapore.” (Wan 
Hussin, 1990:1) Amongst the more sensational problems include the fact that 
younger Malays have chosen to immerse themselves in purely religious activities, 
thus buying into the dichotomy between the religious and the secular, whilst some 
have chosen to engage in gangster activities, going through initiation rites that 
involved paying homage to Chinese deities (Sunday Times, 4 April 1993). This in turn 
is reflected in the Singapore Population Census of 2000 with an unprecedented 0.1 
percent of the Malay community professing Buddhism/Taoism as their official religion. 
What actually confers the “problematic” nature of these Malay problems does not rest 
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in their intrinsic qualities, but the definition that the collective consciousness (may it 
be Malay/Muslim or national; this will be unpacked with greater care later on), 
assigns to them. Other social problems associated with the Malay/Muslims which 
have been oft highlighted since the 1990s includes drug addiction, a high divorce rate 
and premarital sex. Hence, a reexamination of the “Malay Problem” becomes 
necessary as many of the conventionally accepted explanations prove obscuring 
rather than illuminating. 
 
I will first enter into a brief demographic of the field of study. Singapore is a 
city-state of a main island and sixty-three offshore islands which adds up to a land 
area of 682.3 square kilometers. It is generally an urban space with a negligible rural 
sector of 9.8 square kilometers which make up farms. Hence Singapore is not 
bothered with issues of rural-urban migration. Singapore’s compactness and high 
degree of urbanization have aided the policy-making process in a number of ways. 
First, its small size is advantageous for policy formation and implementation since 
communication is seldom a problem and serves to facilitate political control by the 
leadership. Second, the city-state’s compactness enhances the responsiveness of 
public officials. And, Singapore’s diminutiveness has contributed to a highly 
centralized public bureaucracy, immune to the problems of a federal bureaucracy and 
its subsequent interactions with the state or provincial bureaucracies (Quah, 
2003:107). In June 2001, Singapore had a total population of 4,131,200 persons and 
a resident population of 3,319,100. That makes Singapore the third most densely 
populated place in the world after Macau and Hong Kong (Andrews, 2002:15). 
 
The Singapore Population Census of the year 2000 reflects that ethnic 
Malays make up 450 000 of the total population of four million. The ethnic 
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composition has approximately been steady ever since the mid 1800s with the 
Chinese majority having a 77% representation and the other minority group, the 
Indians, numbering 7%. Of the total Singapore population, 15% are Muslims of which 
about 93% of the Muslims are Malays with the other 7% coming from ethnic groups 
such as the Arabs and Indians (Hussin, 2005:54). The Malay who going by the 
Singapore constitution is defined as one who practices the Muslim religion among 
other criteria, can at the very least be characterized as a society held together by 
mechanical solidarity.  
 
As a unit of social analysis, Malay/Muslims are, in actuality, characterized as 
a society in transition, lagging in the shift from a mechanical form of solidarity to an 
organic one which is already a distinct feature of highly industrialized capitalist 
Singapore. To speak of the Malay/Muslims without contextualizing them to Islam will 
be intellectually inept. One has to look at the Muslim concept of ummah (the Muslim 
community or people) and understand how it further complicates and cements this 
notion of community in the Malay life. The notion of community is deeply embedded 
in Muslim thought. Here we can see that the solidarity that Muslims share is rooted in 
religion. It is more ideological than real. Even the concept of community itself is 
problematic as pointed out in Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities.3 It should 
actually be something that is controversial even though it is a taken-for-granted fact 
living in a nation-state today. The solidarity the Malay/Muslims share comes from the 
association to a particular religion is of a transitory mechanical type which, has yet to 
be organic in that it stems from a relationship of interdependence between two 
individuals in a complex division of labour.  
                                                 
3
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991). 
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In Durkheimian sociology, mechanical solidarity, hinges the entire community 
upon something external to the people themselves. In the case of the Malay/Muslims 
in Singapore before its independence in 1965, such a mechanical solidarity hinges 
upon Islam. What we mean here is that Malay/Muslims are bound with one another 
through common routines and rituals.4 The kind of solidarity shared in the 
Malay/Muslim community does not emerge from the continuous distribution of human 
tasks which, as Comte argues, constitutes the principal element in social solidarity.5 
The transitory type of mechanical solidarity which Malay/Muslims’ are a part of has 
manifested itself into the multi-faceted crises which we are witnessing today.  
 
The Burden of a Community 
The burden of the Muslim community is the notion of community itself. The 
coercion to continuously and consciously portray oneself as a representation of a 
community is not only repressive; it suppresses alternative voices within the 
community in favour of the dominant discourse. Characteristic of a society that is 
coming out of a mechanical form of solidarity, Muslims in Singapore are at risk of 
either ignoring their differences, or to view them pathologically as causes of 
separation and suspicion rather than as forces for change. Far from being a site of 
liberation, the irony is that the notion of a ‘community’ harbours the loud silence of a 
recluse with his or her oppression. This is unlike a community governed by an 
organic form of solidarity whereby solidarity does not require a shedding of 
differences, nor the pretense that these differences do not exist. As Durkheim 
argues, a society is not only something attracting the sentiments and activities of 
individuals with unequal force. It is also a power controlling them. I will therefore 
                                                 
4
 Examples of such routines and rituals can include socio-cultural activities like the Maulidur Rasul. 
5
 Emile Durkheim(trans. by W.D. Halls), The Division of Labor in Society (New York, Free Press, 1984) 
p. 23. 
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argue that there is a relation between the way this regulative action is performed and 
what has been coined the “Malay Problem”. 
 
The Muslims had been a society characterized by mechanical solidarity with 
religion, more specifically Islam, as the galvanizing force. It is governed by a set of 
laws and restrictions. Its penal law as in the syariah is diffused throughout society 
rather than centralized in a special institution and the sentiments to which the penal 
law corresponds is imminent in all consciousness. Hence, it does not matter that the 
Syariah Court6 in Singapore only hears and determines proceedings concerning 
disputes over marriage (it also assist couples with marital difficulties to undergo 
counseling), betrothal, nullification of marriage, separation and divorce (Vasil, 
2004:188). It is immaterial whether the syariah is implemented as the official code of 
law in Singapore. The syariah exists in the collective consciousness of the Muslims. 
But more importantly, once the religion has been internalized, we can see the 
overriding influence of the social over that of religion. This can be best illuminated 
with the following illustration. 
 
Take for example the now often cited “Malay Problem” of premarital sex and 
unwed mothers (Straits Times, 31 July 2006; 12 November 2005; 3 March 2002). If 
religion per se was the determining factor, those involved in the above mentioned 
problems would not have even indulged in premarital sex to begin with since the act 
is prohibited in Islam. Since they are not governed by religion, their subsequent 
arriving at marriage, as the solution for unwanted pregnancies (which will inevitably 
lead to a lot divorces due to young age, lack of family planning, financial implications 
                                                 
6
 The Syariah Court in Singapore does not come without any problems. For more problems of 
implementation of policies of the Syariah Court in Singapore, read The Syariah court and the 
administration of the Muslim law on divorce in Singapore by Noor Aisha bte Abdul Rahman, 2000 
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etc.) cannot also be borne out of religion. Rather, it is borne out of social stigma. 
Hence, the Muslim community right down to the Muslim individuals who manifest 
themselves in the forms of parents, friends, neighbours, teachers, etc. takes over the 
mantle as custodians and guardians of the religion. 
 
If we were to follow the argument that the law is the manifest of the social, the 
Singapore constitution under Article 152(2) states that the government is required to 
“exercise its functions in such a manner as to recognize the special position of the 
Malays, who are the indigenous people of Singapore” and “to protect, safeguard, 
support, foster and promote their political, educational, religious, economic, social 
and cultural interests and the Malay language.” Hence, it would be convenient for the 
detractors of the state to pin the dire situation wholly on them. However, having said 
that, Article 152 has never been invoked, challenged or questioned in a court of law. 
Its impact is largely psychological rather than legal (Tan, 2004:104). It is safe to say 
that in Singapore, this special position of the Malays is not a view based on 
consensus. Therefore, we clearly see a disjuncture between what the social is and 
what is manifest in law. Since they no longer go in tandem, this creates an 
environment of deregulation. Singapore's largest Malay-based opposition party 
Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (PKMS) for example, have been 
clamouring for a law that is merely a remnant of the colonial and post-independence 
days that exist today more symbolic than real (Vasil, 2004:103). Another example of 
deregulation is the existence of the often colliding civil law and the syariah law. 
 
A main feature of the “Malay Problem” is the economic backwardness of the 
Malays. If we were to analyze the economic backwardness of the Malays through the 
spectacles of religion, we will find that in Islamic theology, we cannot find any 
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parallels with Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis in the sense that there is a positive 
relationship between the idea of salvation and wealth acquisition (Alatas, 1972; 
Turner, 1998). Even in Malay culture and tradition, the pursuit of material well-being 
was never emphasized. Hence, we can argue that the Malays in Singapore subscribe 
to an ideology that is exclusively theirs, bound by a value system that is totally their 
own. Advanced industrial capitalism is the cornerstone for the birth of what Durkheim 
has called organic solidarity and it is characterized by a complex division of labour 
and high interdependence. Hence, ideologically, if we were to argue that the Muslims 
do not subscribe to such a system, Durkheim’s argument about a community making 
the transition crumbles. 
 
In every society, we can find people not integrating into mainstream society. 
Durkheim was of the opinion that the generality of a phenomena must be taken as a 
criterion of their normality. If the Malays themselves are found to be lagging behind 
the other communities in the pursuit for economic well-being and they need no 
excuses for it, why then would we want to superimpose a crisis on the Malay 
community when it is absent in the minds of the Malays themselves? There is no 
need to rationalize the Malay behavior as pathological or deviant; in fact it could be 
seen as perfectly normal. The “deviant” Malay behavior is not only normal, it is 
necessary because it is bound up with the fundamental conditions of social life and 
that these conditions are integral to the evolution of morality. Hence, the alternate 
lifestyle the Malays provide for plays a definite role in social life. In fact, if social life in 
Singapore was so homogenous, as in everyone behaves the same, this could be 
indicative of a severe social disorder. If we were to follow this line of argument, then 
the notion of the “Malay Problem” becomes something that is externally imposed on 
the Malays themselves. In fact, there are many other approaches that can actually be 
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taken in studying the lived experiences of the Malays. For example, instead of 
looking at the issue from a race perspective, as in the “Malay Problem”, one can 
analyze it from a class perspective. That the problems are reminiscent of those from 
the working class. 
 
Images of differences within the Malay/Muslim community as seen in a 
minority of “deviants” in the case of the tudung issue and the Jemaah Islamiah 
arrests shows that there are fractures “intra-community”. This lends credence to 
Durkheim’s thesis, that while there are the underlying commonalities and similarities 
between us, there also exist a lot of peculiarities. He attributes it partly to the dualism 
of human nature. 
"In brief, this duality corresponds to the double existence that we lead concurrently: the 
one purely individual and rooted in our organisms, the other social and nothing but an 
extension of society." (Durkheim, 1973: 162)  
 
It is important to note here that the “Malay Problem” cannot be locked down to 
a spatial element. Malays/Muslims are now spread evenly throughout the island. This 
can be attributed to the government’s policy of imposing ethnic quotas on public 
housing where about 90% of Singaporeans live. Hence we can see the doing away of 
particular communities living in ethnic enclaves for example Chinatown (for Chinese), 
Geylang Serai (for Malays) and Serangoon (for Indians). Although the state has done 
its best to disperse the various communities into various residential areas to do away 
with the colonial legacy of ethnic enclaves, the success rate of integrating the Malays 
within the larger social setup can be said to minimal. It can be argued that the reason 
behind the lack of success in nurturing the Malays into the predominantly Chinese 
Singaporean community is because the motivation behind this dispersion in the first 
place is not integration but regulation (Tremewan, 1994). It is to regulate the political 
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clout of the Malay community and to keep the Malays in check. However, if the 
intention is regulatory, then it is difficult to argue the case for dispersion according to 
territorial location. Because the collective conscience of the Malays or any society for 
the matter, the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the members of that 
particular society exist in the minds of its members, devoid of geographical space. 
The collective conscience forms a determinate system with a life of its own. 
 
In the socio-economic arena, the number of Malays in the higher occupational 
echelons, both in the public and private sectors, is conspicuously small. This point 
can be better illuminated if we look at education. Statistics for 2000 shows that there 
are a mere 2% of Malay graduates if compared to the 17% for Indians and 13% for 
the Chinese. “Barely half of all the Malay students who sat for the O-level 
examinations made it to the A-level, and less than half of the A-level Malay students 
managed to get into the local universities, NUS and NTU” (Hussin, 2005:56). Many 
reasons have been advanced to account for the relative socio-economic stagnation 
of the Malay community. The job concentration amongst the Malays and their 
crystallization in the lower rungs of society can be extrapolated to account for the lack 
of division of labour within the community. The Malays are still at the stage whereby 
for most cases, another member of the community can easily replicate the role of the 
other in the economy. Within the community itself, there is a lack of interdependence 
characterized by organic solidarity. 
 
Whilst the problems of many other communities might be caused by a high 
level of stratification, I will argue that with the Malays in Singapore, it is exactly the 
opposite. The Malays in Singapore, as has been shown in the statistical evidence 
above, is generally less stratified. The lack of a division of labour which can easily be 
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shown by the mere fact that Malays form an over proportionate concentration in 
particular kinds of jobs is the result of years of crystallization in the lower rungs of the 
educational ladder which has seen the Malays consolidate themselves in the lower 
classes of the social strata. Hence, it is common during the course of interviews with 
the elites that one hears statements like “I was not born into an elite family” and 
stories of the hard lives these elites have to go through to be where they are today. 
 
 Since the division of labour increases both the productive capacity and skill of 
the workman, it is the necessary condition for the intellectual and material 
development in societies. As a complex or advanced division of labour is not evident 
in the Malay community, it results in an adverse effect on the community. Because 
each occupation constitutes a milieu sui generis which requires particular aptitudes 
and specialized knowledge, in which certain ideas, practices or modes of doing 
things prevail; the Malays who are mostly located within the lower rungs of the 
economic strata, find themselves dislocated from the larger society.  
 
The problem can be traced back to 1951 when the Education Department 
revised the entire Malay-medium Education System and its place introduced a new 
policy called the “Re-orientation Plan” (Annual Report 1951- Department of 
Education, 1952:79). The rationale for introducing this Plan was that, in view of the 
changes in the general structure of Malay society during the post-war years, the 
British Government felt that the Malays could no longer isolate themselves and that if 
they wanted to compete effectively with the other races domiciled in Singapore, they 
should acquire an adequate command of the English language. The Government at 
that time looked to English education as a means to alleviate the problem of Malay 
poverty. The Malay society with the help of the Malay press, Utusan Melayu, 
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protested long and hard. A committee, the Malay Education Committee (MEC) put up 
by the Malay community in January 1958 reminded the Ministry that an agreement to 
introduce Islamic education in the Malay schools have not been implemented by the 
state. The MEC accused the Government of attempting to kill Malay-medium 
education and destroy the Malay/Muslim traditional values. The Malay/Muslim elites 
feared that Malay/Muslim pupils would adopt new values which might conflict with 
those of their parents and with traditional Malay thinking and aspirations. Children 
might, they argued, by intermingling with other races in English schools, lose their 
Muslim habits, customs and become more westernized in outlook. Gradually, Malay 
culture and education would face extinction. Hence, the Re-orientation Plan was, to 
the Malay/Muslim elites then, a sinister attempt by the Government to stifle the Malay 
way of life. This reverence of tradition and customs comes into direct collision with 
the essential principles that Durkheim, a product of the Enlightenment project, seeks 
the State to outline; respect for reason, for science, for ideas and sentiments which 
are at the base of democratic morality. 
 
This mentality of the Malays continued way into the 60s and 70s even after 
Singapore gained independence and the state was opening up English schools with 
the other communities attending in droves. We are all born into society as asocial 
beings. Obviously, we do not know society's language, skills, or customs, and we 
must learn these to survive - both as individuals and as a group. This resistance to be 
integrated into the larger society has cost the Malay/Muslim community dearly today.7 
As a generation or two have changed hands since independence, the inequalities 
have not only become entrenched, the gap has also widened. The inequality that is 
                                                 
7
 the statistics of the socio-economic status of the Malays are presented in both pp 35-36 and p 40 
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now structural is costing the Malays not only socially but economically and politically. 
It has now become a question of social reproduction.  
 
Even in the highly industrialized society that we live in today; there is still a 
high chance of a Malay being able to replicate the role of the other. The lack of social 
stratification and a division of labour have contributed to what is today called the 
“Malay Problem”. The dilemma facing the Malay Muslim community has been laid out 
in no uncertain terms. In 2001, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew commented that the 
Malays are at a crossroad. The two paths they have to choose from are to either 
support the present policy of gradual integration or to differentiate and distant itself 
from the larger society (Tan, 20004:85). 
 
Because the norms of society and social living has changed due to the 
advanced and complex division of labour weaved around the way we live today, the 
Malays are trapped in between themselves and the norms of the larger community. 
Do they hang on to the mechanical solidarity which is characterized by religion, or do 
they abandon these norms and embrace those of the other? Anomie is manifested in 
the social problems that have become synonymous with the Malays today. Anomie is 
simply defined as a state where norms (expectations on behaviours) are confused, 
unclear or not present. It is a sense of normlessness, according to Durkheim, that will 
lead to deviant behaviour. The mechanical solidarity that characterizes Muslim life 
comes into collision with the organic solidarity which governs modern highly 
industrialized Singapore society. Due to the collision, deregulation occurs along the 
fault lines hence slipping the Malays into anomie; trapped between the regulatory 
powers of mechanical and organic solidarity. 
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Two ways of looking at the “Malay Problem” have been advanced. The first 
route is the blame the government way. It can be summed up in a statement made in 
the Singapore Dilemma: the Political and Educational Marginality of the Malay 
Community. In a scathing attack on the state and its apparatus, the author situates 
the problem squarely on the racist policies of the government. 
“The rhetoric that Singapore is a meritocratic society where equal opportunities are 
available to all has also served to add legitimacy to the cultural deficit thesis which 
infers that Malays have not been able to make it in a meritocratic society because they 
have not worked hard enough and thus have only themselves to blame.” (Lily Zubaidah 
Rahim, 1998: 58) 
 
There is little credibility in arguing solely based on the first route as it offers 
only a one-dimensional point of view. The point is that the “Malay Problem” has to be 
talked about and appreciated in context. It should be understood and made sense of 
in its full bloom and in all its complexity. The second route goes the way of pointing 
the fingers at the Malays themselves. This line of contention is echoed even amongst 
the Malays themselves primarily gaining resonance primarily amongst the 
Malay/Muslim political elites (Lily Zubaidah, 1998), not only locally but also across the 
border as seen in former Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir in his book, The 
Malay Dilemma. Some have even gone down the biologically determinist route, citing 
that it is inherent in the Malays to be this and that. 
 
I will argue that it is important for us to see the various shades of social reality 
and not indulge in essentializing. In trying to understand, it is important not to attempt 
to define and interpret revolving around a struggle to classify and compartmentalize 
and to rid ourselves off the false pursuit for authenticity or what Zygmunt Bauman 
has aptly phrased as “the dream of purity” (Bauman, 1997). Positioning an object will 
allow for a compartmentalizing of the object. This curbs the discursive space as we 
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no longer see a need to discuss alternative ideas and viewpoints since we assume 
that we already know all there is to know about what it is we are looking at. In 
actuality, I would suggest that it sits somewhere uncomfortably between the two.  
 
I refer to the speech by Mr Goh Chok Tong, Senior Minister, at the Malay 
community’s tribute High Tea, on the 12th of February 2005. In the field of education, 
Mr Goh emphasized that the Malays had made “real and solid gains”. He highlighted 
the fact that there was an increase of 24% of Malay students eligible for secondary 
school from 1990 to 2003. He also emphasized that “in 2003, 73% of Malay students 
moved on to post-secondary education, doubled from the 36% in 1990. Last year, the 
community produced a record of 8 First Class Honours students. In 1990, there were 
none.” These are definitely laudable achievements indeed. In terms of employment, 
Mr Goh highlighted that there are “more Malay professionals such as lawyers, 
engineers and architects, compared to ten years ago”. Also, “the proportion of Malays 
holding professional jobs rose from 2% in 1990 to 4% in 2000. Over the same period, 
the proportion of Malays holding technical jobs had similarly doubled from 8.6% to 
16.4%.”8 
 
So, why is the “Malay Problem” still seemingly a non-erasable feature of 
Singapore politics? This is because at the national level, I would argue; the constant 
demonizing and the moral panic caused by the “Malay Problem” (Hill, 2001:21-24) 
can prove lucrative. The state and its agents engage in a celebration of the deviant, 
in this case the Malays, so as to consolidate the moral boundaries and the social 
norms of the majority. These very public executions serve the society well and further 
                                                 
8
 Speech by Mr Goh Chok Tong,Senior Minister, At the Malay Community's Tribute High Tea, 12 
February 2005, 2.00 Pm at Raffles Ballroom, Raffles City Convention Centre, 
http://www.mendaki.org.sg/content.jsp?cont_cat_id=9&cont_id=512 
 41 
demarcate the “us” versus “them” discourse and illuminate the approved kinds of 
behaviour for society to tread. For all the Malays are concerned, the “Malay Problem” 
can even be totally external to them hence the discourse of the contented Malays. 
However, this image of them has been hijacked to serve a purpose grander than the 
Malays themselves. By constantly reminding the national audience that the Malay 
community is a “soft community where high standards or difficult goals are not 
thought to be worth the effort” (Straits Times, 10 October 1992), this image of the 
Malays is not only maintained but continues to be perpetuated (Straits Times, 4 
February 2005; 21 January 2003; 9 August 1990 and 8 February 1991). Hence, if we 
were to take this line of thought, the ghost of the “Malay Problem” will always be 
evoked from time to time and the Malays will always function as the inevitable 
element of difference that validates the majority within Singapore. 
 
To look at history and linear time progression to be the basis of comparison 
between the Malays and the other ethnic groups is a false one. The constant talk of 
how the Chinese and Indians are performing better than the Malays is cheap. No 
matter how much time is given to those lagging behind to “catch up”, the same 
amount of time is also allocated to those leading the race to move along in their 
progression. No other communities are going to wait around for the Malays to catch 
up with them. Society is in perpetual motion. Hence, those who have had a head start 
in history will usually be leading the way unless something tumultuous like a major 
upheaval (e.g. wars, revolutions and disasters) was to happen. Hence, this form of 
comparison is necessarily a false one. 
 
There is no doubt that the Malays in Singapore (and by extension, the 
Muslims) are still besieged with a lot of problems but there is also no denying that 
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contradictory as it may sound, the larger society are reaping the benefits of it. It is 
against the backdrop of the deluge of social problems that we find and locate the 





This chapter will seek to map out the variations in elite structures of the social, 
religious and political elites. It will critically analyze the first hypothesis, that variations 
in elite formation and functioning are decisive for certain major political outcomes. 
This chapter will also delve into the social relationships of elites within and across 
categories of the social, religious and political elites hence illuminating and 
highlighting concerns brought up in the second hypothesis. I will also discuss recent 
developments such as the advent of the knowledge-based economy and examine 
how it has impact the Muslim elites in Singapore. 
 
Disorganization and Reorganization 
Many works that have discussed “political Islam” thus far has done violence to 
the phrase itself. In the relentless demonizing of “political Islam” the term has gained 
for itself a pejorative status and is seen as a negative, both at the level of denotation 
and connotation. This study wishes to distance itself from such labeling, categorizing 
and compartmentalizing. Instead, in the next two chapters, I wish to present a more 
mundane and everyday reading of the phrase to mean the politics of the Muslims. 
This chapter will study the politics of the Muslim elites in negotiating themselves as a 
minority group within the unique setup of a secular country set in a predominantly 
Muslim Archipelago. 
 
Singapore does not have a state religion. The official government stance 
towards religion can be said to be one of neutrality. However, Islam occupies a 
special place in the heart of the secular state. As early as into the first year of 
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Singapore’s inception as an independent nation in 1966, the Administration of Muslim 
Law Act (AMLA) was charted to enhance the system of administration governing the 
Muslims in Singapore. The Government maintains an intimate relationship with the 
Muslim community through the formation of a statutory board, Islamic Religious 
Council (MUIS), which was established under the AMLA in 1968. MUIS advises the 
Government on the Muslim community's concerns and has regulatory authority over 
Muslim religious matters. The Government, on their part, facilitates financial 
assistance in the building and maintenance of mosques. The predominantly non-
Muslim state’s “love affair” with Islam does not stop there. It has also incorporated a 
Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs. In a semi-authoritarian state that characterizes 
Singapore, the Muslim elites have to also constantly deal with the ambiguous Out of 
Bound Markers and the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act. 
 
The Biology of Organizations 
I have intentionally used the analogy of a biology in order to trace the origins 
and characteristics of these organizations. I would like to document the evolution of 
the organizations and the formation of the elites which will inevitably have an effect 
on their functions. The individual’s quest for power cannot be realized in isolation but 
only by interaction. Even under today’s modern conditions, when isolated individuals 
and their personal interests are considered to be the basic components of society 
and politics, communication and interaction according to the laws of the market are 
necessary for success. In other words, whoever wants to sell her- or him- self, has to 
“advertise” to interest potential demand (Reinhard, 1996:6). In this chapter and the 
following one, I will look at the Muslim elites both horizontally and vertically, the 
struggle between and the struggle within, the struggle inter-elites between various 
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categorizations of elites and the struggle intra-elites within social groups and 
organizations.  
 
The Social Elites 
During the course of fieldwork, I picked up a term used amongst the elites - 
that of Chairman Sampai Mati (Chairman till Death). It is used to symbolize the 
rootedness and entrenched power held by the leaders of these organizations who for 
the most part, have been in power in their particular organizations for decades. This 
phenomenon seems prevalent amongst Muslim organizations in Singapore. I will 
argue that this is a feature of the remnants of a mechanical form of solidarity which 
used to characterize the Muslim community as opposed to the organic solidarity of 
the larger Singapore society.  
 
Just to state a number of the more prominent social elites, Abu Bakar Maidin, 
for example has led Muslim Missionary Society Singapore (Jamiyah), a local Muslim 
organization since 1970. Embek Ali was President of Association of Adults Religious 
Class Students of Singapore (Perdaus) from 1974 till 1999. Ridzwan Wu has been 
the President of The Muslim Convert's Association of Singapore (Darul Arqam) since 
its formation till early this year. Wan Hussin has been the President of Prophet 
Muhammad’s Birthday Memorial Scholarship Fund Board (LBKM) since 1995 and he 
took over the post from Syed Ali Redha Alsagoff who has held the post for 30 years 
(Sulaiman Jeem and Abdul Ghani, 1997:429-430). Ustaz Hussein has been 
President of the religious and welfare organization, Muhammadiyah for twenty two 
years and Izzuddin Taherally has been President of Malay Youth Literary Association 
(4PM) an organization focusing on welfare, education and youth development of the 
community for much around the same time. Even when one comes down to the 
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student organizations, for example, one can still see semblances of the Chairman 
Sampai Mati. Ustaz Manaf has been the President of the Fellowship of Muslim 
Students Association (FMSA) since its formation in the 1980s. A few of these leaders 
have since come to pass whilst others are still in office. It remains to be seen if this 
trend is set to continue. 
 
The “Malay Problem”, as seen in the previous chapter has a direct 
repercussion on the proportionally low number of social and political elites who are 
racially Malay. Many of the leaders today who are in their forties and fifties are 
affected by the generation discussed in the previous chapter. Although the Malays 
make up 93% of the Muslim population in Singapore, this does not translate into that 
significant a majority when it comes to elite representation in social and political 
institutions. 
 
Two commonly held perceptions of the Chairman Sampai Mati gathered 
during fieldwork, are that of the “consensus manager” who brings his team together 
through adroit persuasion to achieve a communally defined goal and that of the “take 
charge guy” whose vision and dynamic leadership galvanizes others into concerted 
action. Although one can observe these and many other leadership styles in any 
hierarchy, such images, popular amongst managers themselves, are fictions that 
conceal the essential political and personal problems these leaders face in making 
decisions (Jackall, 1988:75). In conducting interviews with one such “Chairman 
Sampai Mati” and his direct subordinates, contradictions can be drawn between the 
two concepts of “consensus manager” and the “take charge guy”. The elite member 
alluded to the fact that being a charismatic leader is crucial in order to win the hearts 
and minds of his followers. He deems it absolutely necessary as members in his 
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organization constitute mostly of volunteers. As the volunteers are neither under any 
obligations nor are they bound institutionally to stay at the particular organization, 
these volunteers are free to come and go. Hence, the leader feels that it is necessary 
to project such a style of leadership. However, when members of his Board of 
Directors were interviewed, a contrasting take of the situation emerged. Stories of the 
“take charge guy” emerge and some went to the extent of talking about a dictatorial 
and authoritarian form of leadership whereby statements like, “He thinks that he is 
always right” and “He doesn’t listen to others” are in abundance.  
 
At this juncture, it will be unfair to say that the lack of democracy in Singapore 
is the monopoly and the dominion of the state. The problem could turn out to be that 
the fate of these organizations is bound up with the Chairmen that preside over them. 
The power to impose recognition depends on the capacity to mobilize around an 
individual. One sees an irony with the term “social elites”. Although the word “social” 
connotes an emphasis on relationships, the “social elite”, characterized by a 
persistence of aggregates, have turned the term on its head. Since most members of 
these organizations are volunteers, who in essence should be fluid by nature, why 
have most of them chosen to stay in the organizations despite the “dictatorial nature 
of leadership”? 
 
Most of the reasons given can be said to be ideological in nature. These 
volunteers tolerate the situation because they subscribe to and relate to the 
organization’s ideology and orientation of Islam i.e.  a “common cause” . For those 
who chose to stay, the style of leadership becomes relegated to the peripheral. For 
the rest who chose to leave, some form new splinter organizations. 
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 Some amongst the Board rationalized the prolonged stay in office of their 
leaders by attributing it to their seniority. The elites too allude to this fact themselves. 
Seniority connotes experience and as an extension, wisdom. Perhaps, more than the 
Muslim community will like to admit, the Muslims are more Confucian in the aspect of 
adopting rule by seniority, than the Chinese themselves who according to numerous 
literature and surveys, is a community suffering from an identity crisis. It seems like 
the Muslims have internalized the gaze of the dominant other. 
 
 An AMP President also pointed to the issue of a generational gap that existed 
a few decades ago when leaders like him were trying to make their mark. He felt that 
a gap exists between former leaders like Ahmad Mattar and Othman Wok, for 
example, and the new batch. He posited that the situation is much better today as the 
leaders are of the same cohort. Many of them had gone to the local university during 
more or less the same time, sharing the same stage in the National University of 
Singapore Muslim Society (NUSMS) and the National University of Singapore Malay 
Language Society (PBMUKS). As such, he said, there is better understanding 
amongst the elites today as many of the leaders today are from the same generation. 
This common experience and the shared historical baggage have reaped greater 
understanding and cohesion amongst the elites. I will argue that this generational gap 
is a result of the fact that these leaders and many others were displaced in most 
organizations in Singapore. The phenomenon of the Chairman Sampai Mati has 
caused these young elites to feel displaced hence further cementing the generational 
gap thesis in their minds. The lack of succession and injection of new blood by the 
elites have led to a crisis of generational gap. 
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Some of the Muslim power elites tend to take a patronizing view of the 
community. Political elites who adopt this standpoint have been well documented 
(Lily Zubaidah 1998, Tania Li 1989, Barr 2000). However, during the course of 
interviews conducted, it is discovered that this strand of thinking is also evident in 
Muslim social organizations. A leader of a Muslim social organization, during the 
course of an interview, kept lamenting the fact that Muslims in Singapore are not able 
to take care of themselves. Hence, according to him, this inadequacy of the Malays 
justifies the existence of MUIS and the Minister-in-change of Muslim Affairs as 
regulatory bodies in the Muslim community. 
 
Another “disease” according to a member of the social elite is not only the fact 
that people leave the organization (because of competition for positions or conflict of 
personality, character, values, ideology and race) people have also been leaving 
organizations to form splinter groups. There are various problems with respect to this. 
Firstly, it is very problematic for a small community to have multiple organizations in 
existence duplicating the same roles. This is, according to another informant, a 
prevalent attitude in the Muslim community in Singapore. Leaving and forming a new 
organization is perceived to be the remedy for one’s grievances may it be internal 
(problems that exist within the individual’s organization) or external (that the 
respective organizations are not apt at achieving the individual’s specific targets). 
 
When asked whether the duplicating and replicating of roles amongst Muslim 
organizations is a sign of inefficacy and if it will eventually be detrimental to the 
community, Mr Yang Razali, the former President of AMP, talked about the value of 
what he called the “many helping hands” strategy. He alluded to the fact that there 
are many amongst the community who are in need and that even though there is 
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quite a significant amount of similar programmes being conducted by organizations, 
say AMP and Mendaki for example, these programmes are not identical. 
 
The other problem that is encountered once people leave the parent 
organizations and form splinter groups is the lost sense of history. Therefore there 
exist the phenomenon today of new generation leaders from splinter groups who 
when interviewed totally denounce any associations or links to the parent 
organization. Some to create a niche for themselves, some due to a real shift in 
ideology and focus but others just ignorant to the fact. 
 
In recent years the more prominent of the Muslim social organizations is the 
Association of Muslim Professional (AMP) which is formed in 1991. The organization 
sees itself as playing 3 major roles: (1) To enhance understanding and respect 
amongst various communities in Singapore; (2) to act as a feedback institution to the 
government on issues affecting the Muslims in Singapore and (3) to play a role in 
aiding the Muslim underachievers (Kamaroonnisa, 1994:1-2). However, it has been 
argued that the organization has since either been neutralized or coopted by the 
government (Worthington, 2003:36). There exists a claim that AMP, which through 
some of its objectives directly challenged the role of MENDAKI, the government’s 
Malay community development organization, was co-opted by the government in 
1991 and is now substantially under its direction through the PAP Malay MPs (Chua 
Beng Huat, 1991:253-266). And these arguments were sustained even before AMP 
President Alami Musa became MUIS President. However, within AMP ranks, the 




Mr Yatiman, a Muslim MP for the last twenty-two years talked about how 
perceptions towards him have changed for the better over the last two decades and 
he attributed the change in attitude to the economic and educational progress that 
the Malays have made alongside other Singaporeans. He attributed the community's 
accomplishments to 'a collective success of the Malay leadership over the years'. He 
found it heartening that even the vocal Association of Muslim Professionals, which 
once challenged Malay MPs, is working closely with Mendaki, which Malay MPs 
helped set up in the early 1980s to help such families. 'We have achieved a certain 
degree of cohesiveness in our leadership... both share the common view that we 
have to work harder and together to solve our community's problems,'  (Straits 
Times, 25 March 2006). 
 
Not only are they working closely together, the expanding patterns of co-
optation of the government has seen Alami Musa cross over from the “opposite 
camp”. The switch of Alami Musa from the Association of Muslim Professionals 
(AMP) to the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) makes for interesting 
analysis. The AMP was set up in 1990 by a prominent group of well-educated 
Malay/Muslim intellectuals and professionals as an independent social, educational 
and welfare organization that wanted no affiliation with any political party. In fact 
membership is open only to Malay/Muslims. The former AMP President is now 
President of the government statutory board, MUIS. AMP is traditionally known as the 
other side of the coin to Mendaki. Mendaki and the AMP have been criticized for not 
working together hence dividing the resources in the community (Straits Times, 25 
October 1991). Mendaki also serves the Malay and Muslim people. Tamney argues 
that Mendaki was created about a decade before any of the other racial groups, as a 
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result of the Government’s long-standing concern to avoid its neighbours’ criticism of 
the PAP for neglecting Malays (Tamney, 1996:1-23). 
 
The Religious Elites 
 The influence of the religious elites vis a vis the larger national setting is an 
indirect one. With the increasing religiosity of the local Muslim community, it can 
certainly be argued that the religious elites hold a significant amount of influence over 
public sentiments. As a result, the state in its continuous quest for legitimacy cannot 
ignore the sentiments of the ground and this can be seen in the different form of 
recruitment pattern of the state in relation to the Muslim political elites. In the past few 
years we have seen a few leaders from religious organizations like Muhammadiyah 
and Perdaus join the PAP government and also a tudung clad female political elite. 
Later in the chapter, we will look at how the tudung emerged as a site of contention in 
2002. 
 
 The notion of the religious elite becomes very problematic. Who gets to define 
who the religious elite are? However, measures to institutionalize and formalize those 
who the titles of ustazs and ustazahs can be accredited to are under way to ‘remedy’ 
this situation. Religious teachers will now go on the Asatizah Recognition Scheme 
(Straits Times, 29 Dec 2005, 9 January 2006). It goes beyond the voluntary self-
registration for asatizah that was introduced in 2002. The new scheme will allow only 
registered teachers to be called ustaz, for men, and ustazah, for women. The board 
is made up of Ustaz Ali Mohamed, chairman of the Khadijah Mosque who chairs the 
eight-member board. It includes: Ustaz Mohamad Rais, president of the Syariah 
Court, Ustaz Mohamad Hasbi Hassan, president of PERGAS, and Ustaz Pasuni 
Maulan, chairman of the Madrasah Aljunied management committee. Those who are 
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rejected can appeal to a three-member panel chaired by the Mufti, Syed Isa Semait. 
However, there are contestations to this form of accreditation. 
 
 This has led to a number of religious elites feeling displaced and 
dispossessed. Even though, some of these elites do not have colourful educational 
backgrounds, they do exert a significant amount of influence in the Muslim 
community. Freelance preacher Ustaz Ahmad Dahri wants the scheme to recognise 
teachers with experience but without the required qualifications. 'Recognition by the 
wider community is a form of recognition as well. It's a good certificate too.' Popular 
freelance preacher Ustaz Fahrurazi Kiayi Kassim, who lacks formal religious 
qualifications but is taking a diploma course run by PERGAS and Perdaus, hopes 
being recognized will reduce apprehension others may have towards him (Straits 
Times, 29 Dec 2005). A president of a Muslim social organization here retorted with 
indignation as to who gave these asatizahs the right to proclaim themselves ulamas? 
He continued that even those so called ulamas from PERGAS too teach society the 
wrong teachings of Islam. Here, we could see that there is a blurring of the social and 
religious elites. 
 
 Syed Isa bin Mohamed bin Semait, an Arab Muslim, is Singapore’s Mufti. He 
has held office for over 3 decades. In a book published by MUIS, the Mufti has been 
likened to almost an institution in the Singapore Muslim community. There are claims 
that his religious pronouncements are sometimes dictated by the government. To 
which he said “In all my 22 years I can safely say that the government has never 
interfered in my work or given me any direction. People will say what they will”. He 
proudly says that the government has done well in protecting the Muslims’ identity 
and interests (Zuraidah, 1994:69). The position of the Singapore Mufti is a peculiarity 
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unto itself. He is undeniably a religious elite, complete with a degree from Al Azhar 
(one of the most prestigious Islamic university in the world) and all, within the setup of 
a secular state, positioned in an institution/organization created by the state whereby 
the highest authority of the statutory board is the President who is a government 
bureaucrat, a civil servant. The Mufti plays a pivotal role in the disciplining of Islam in 
Singapore. Touted by the state as the highest authority on Islam (Straits Times, 7 
February 2002), he is well placed within the hierarchy to take on the task of 
normalizing judgment.  
 
 Under the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA), The President of 
Singapore may, after consultation with the Majlis, appoint a fit and proper person to 
be the Mufti of Singapore. The Mufti is located within the Majlis Ugama Islam 
Singapura (MUIS), also known as the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore which 
was established as a statutory body in 1968 under sections 87 and 88 of the AMLA, 
to oversee the development and progress of madrasah education. The MUIS and the 
Mufti are given their legislative and disciplinary powers by the AMLA. Under the 
AMLA, MUIS is to advise the President of Singapore on all matters relating to Islam 
in Singapore. Amongst the principal functions of MUIS is the issuance of fatwas 
(religious rulings). Although these institutional ties might give state officials significant 
leverage over the religious scholarly community, most in the religious community 
managed to escape state control. 
 
But it was only in 1990, after pressure exerted from no less than the Prime 
Minister himself (1999 National Day Rally Speech, Berita Harian 5 September 1999, 
Straits Times, 2 May 2000), that MUIS enforced its constitutional powers and 
intensified its efforts to improve the madrasah education system. A study on the 
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madrasahs notes that this is due to the fact that the relationship between MUIS and 
the madrasahs, which comprises of mainly the religious elites, has not been smooth 
all along (Tan, 2006:151). It is evident during conducted interviews that MUIS’s 
efforts in improving the madrasah system have been impaired not only due to the 
lack of efficiency of the organization, but also due to the resistance of the religious 
elites. Although Tan documented the fact that the madrasahs, who have been 
running themselves independently of the MUIS for decades resented having to be 
held accountable to MUIS, he did not say why the madrasahs resented it. 
 
I will bring forth two reasons as to why it is difficult for the religious elites to 
work closely with MUIS. One being more obvious than the other. The first reason, 
being the simple fact that a portion of the religious elites see MUIS as agents and the 
apparatus of the state. Hence, they do not welcome MUIS’s intervention into 
determining their curriculum. Here we see the struggle of knowledge as a means of 
power. Knowledge is seen as being used to satisfy the interests of a group. The 
manner in which individuals and groups invest in classificatory systems envelopes 
their whole social being and further cements the notion of ''us'' as opposed to ''them.'' 
This scheme of exclusion and inclusion is in operation both on the sides of the 
religious elites and MUIS who represents the governmental elites. Social identity lies 
in difference. Hence, even if the recommendations made by MUIS are beneficial, 
perceptions already prejudges the motivations and intentions of the other. 
 
The other reason that is not so apparent is the issue of orientations. The 
brand of Islam that one practices. Although, this does not necessarily put the diverse 
religious elites at odds with each other, it renders working together towards a 
common madrasah education, virtually impossible. There are also religious elites 
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who are overtly at odds with the other/s. During the course of an interview conducted, 
a President of a Muslim organization claims, “Who says that PERGAS is the 
institution of ulamas? They themselves claim that. Even they teach society the wrong 
things”. 
 
However, during an interview with a couple of members from the religious 
elites, they pointed out that within PERGAS, there is no one ideology and orientation. 
The religious elites are of various orientations and leanings. It is clear to the elites 
that Islam in Singapore is characterized by a diversity of views. One of them pointed 
out an interesting point. That it also works for the religious elite and his organization 
that there is a proliferation of views. It sways to their advantage not only socially, but 
politically and strategically as well. He asserted that the difference that exists within 
the religious elites in his organization meant that as an organization, they could not 
be easily co-opted; that it will not be easy for an external to exert social control. 
 
 This reflected the fact that in the religious elite circle, the recruitment and 
training of ‘those who know’ was never a state monopoly. The process of ulama 
education was carried out in numerous centres- in local society and in far-away lands 
where pilgrims studied with renowned scholars. The existence of multiple centres of 
education created the potential of rival religious authorities in the Muslim community. 
This pluricentrism also meant that ideological unanimity was rare. It was common for 
‘centre-periphery’ tensions to develop among scholars, most frequently between 
those in service of state authority and those at the subaltern margins (Hefner, 
2004:124-129). Talking about religious elites at the periphery, their counter-
hegemonic potential becomes even more magnified and unbridled. Due to the mere 
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fact that they are at the periphery, they often escape the radar and as a result, have 
more room to maneuver. 
 
 What is central here are the networked nature of religious authority, centre-
periphery tensions in the ulama network, and the dialogical relationship of scholars 
with the surrounding society. It is this uniquely Muslim sociology of religious reform 
that has underlaid the flux and reflux of Muslim religious life over the course of ages. 
Rather than the Khaldunian dichotomy of the urbanite and nomad, the real fount of 
Islamic reform is this three sided dynamic among the networked scholars, powerful 
elites, and the community of believers (Hefner, 2004:128). 
 
 Hence, there exist a potential for the religious elites to exert a counter-
hegemonic influence. It can certainly be argued that the influence of these 
autonomous religious elites in Singapore is immense. Not only is the community at 
large seeking spiritual direction from the religious elites and sending their children to 
be under their guidance in the local madrasahs, the social elites, the professionals 
(including lawyers and doctors), graduates and even the political elites are sending 
their children to the madrasahs. The perception that only the religious elites are 
running the madrasahs and that the madrasahs are only the project of the religious 
elites is also a myth. Through interviews conducted, it was discovered that numerous 
professionals from various fields and droves of graduates from the National Institute 
of Education, National University of Singapore, Universiti Malaysia, Al-Azhar 
University, University Islam Antarabangsa, Institut Agama Islam Negeri Indonesia 
(Afiza and Lai, 2006:139) have also flocked to the six madrasahs to lend their 
expertise to the madrasah’s cause. This adds to the fact that madrasah education is 
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increasing in popularity amongst the Muslim community (Tan, 2004:86, Noor Aisha, 
2006:65-66, Mukhlis, 2006:37).  
 
 The influence of the religious elite vis-à-vis the larger national setting is an 
indirect one. Although religious clerics such as those in Singapore Islamic Scholars & 
Religious Teachers Association (PERGAS) do not actually hold positions in the state, 
the corporation and the military, it will be foolish to discount their importance in 
shaping the discourse in the nation as they do command, in the Muslim community, a 
national audience. It can be argued that although they aren’t political elites, the 
influence they wield can yield concrete political ramifications. 
 
 PERGAS underwent a process of reorganisation in 1999. They were until 
then, functioning mostly as a welfare body for their members. The transformation saw 
the inclusion of 'scholars' in their name, in a makeover that elevated their role as 
leaders of the Singapore Muslim community (Straits Times, 2 October 2004). After 
seeing a rare case in which the Singapore Government rolled back a policy initiative 
after its announcement (when the state tried to impose compulsory education in 
madrasahs), Tan was of the view that an organization like PERGAS, although small 
is well-organized and cannot be discounted. The Malay Members of Parlaiment 
(MPs) were shocked by the open protest, naturally worried at how the show of 
“dissent” by the Muslim community is going to be perceived by the Government and 
other communities (Tan, 2006:158-162). It is also a point worth noting that debates 
regarding Muslim community issues also raged in a website maintained by PERGAS 




 The change was necessary. A year earlier, the Muslim community was 
confronted with the issue of the poor academic performance of madrasah students. 
At the turn of the century, several Islam-related issues rocked the community, 
beginning with the Government's proposal to make it compulsory for all 
Singaporeans to attend national schools - as opposed to privately-run religious 
schools like some Muslims did. This was followed by the controversy over the 
wearing of the tudung (headscarf) in government schools, the terrorist attacks in the 
United States, the arrests of the Jemaah Islamiah operatives here (White Paper, The 
Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism)  and the attack on Iraq, all 
posing tough dilemmas for the community. All these issues required the religious 
elites to mobilize and speak up (Straits Times, 2 Oct 2004). 
 
The Political Elites: Straddling the Nation and the Community 
“By the circulation of elites, the governing elite is in a state of continuous and slow 
transformation. It flows like a river, and what it is today is different from what it was yesterday. Every so 
often, there are sudden and violent disturbances. The river floods and breaks its banks.” (Pareto, 
1935:250) 
        
The Malay/Muslim MP has long been known to be in a precarious position. 
They are said to be in a more challenging position compared to their Chinese 
counterparts. Malay resentment of their political and economic marginalization and 
their cynicism about PAP Malay leaders (Straits Times, 6 October 1990) has been 
reflected in a consistent anti-PAP Malay vote (Tremewan, 1994:65). Lee Kuan Yew 
said in a speech in NUS that the PAP never did win a majority of the Malay votes 
(Straits Times, 16 Dec 1986). Understandably Malays do not support the PAP as 
much as the Chinese and Malays who become PAP MPs lose grassroots support 
(Mendaki 1993:22). 
 60 
Therein lies the contradiction of multiracialism whereby the Muslim political 
elites, by virtue of the ethnic quota are voted into power by a majority non-Muslim 
population who were not particularly concerned with Muslim issues. The Muslim 
political elite is then faced with the daunting prospect of appeasing both their majority 
non-Muslim electors and the Muslim community who is the reason they actually got a 
seat in the first place by virtue of the ethnic quota. And as an extension, what is 
indeed ironical resides in the fact that parliamentary seats were distributed along the 
lines of an ethnic quota, not a religious one. 
 
When it comes to analyzing the Muslim political elites it is also pertinent for us 
to go back to the point raised in the previous chapter on the concept of the ummah as 
being central to Muslim thought. It is instructive to mention here, that the Muslim 
political elites do not only find themselves straddling between the nation and the 
Muslim community but increasingly so, they find themselves straddling the ummah 
and the local Muslim community. It is indeed interesting to scrutinize the paradoxical 
position the political elites find themselves in. 
 
The Ummah and the State 
There is an inherent tension when one talks about the ummah and the state. 
The tension exists between the particular and the universal. The ummah is the 
concept that binds the Muslims of the world together into an unbreakable chain. It is 
sui generis, an external that the Muslim is born into. It is a global fraternity of 
brotherhood that sparks off social action and from time to time social change. The 




The state on the other hand is a limiting concept. Its very existence hinges 
upon the concept of sovereignty. It necessitates the notion of difference to distinguish 
and make distinct itself from the other. It perpetuates the “us” versus “them” ideology 
and prides itself on being unique (How many countries actually use the word unique 
as the slogan for their tourism campaigns?). 
 
This is not to argue that there are no peculiarities within the ummah itself. On 
the contrary, as I’ve argued in the section on the Burden of the Community, the 
Muslim community or at least a section of it will feel compelled to react to happenings 
halfway across the globe. It is against this backdrop that the Singapore Muslim 
political elites are located. It is a tenuous position because the Muslim elites are not 
only supposed to look after the welfare and the rights of the Muslim community within 
the state, they are also expected to take a stand on behalf of the Muslim community 
in a state that is deemed representative to the Singapore Muslim population when it 
comes to addressing issues of the ummah. In addition, the political elites are faced 
with a situation whereby the Muslims in Singapore make up a mere 17% of the 
population. Together with the nature of the government that has been detailed in the 
first chapter, it would seem that the Muslim political elites in Singapore will find 
themselves entangled in an arduous situation. Furthermore, since these Muslim elites 
are located within the dominant People’s Action Party, they also have to toe the party 
line and represent community and national interests at the same time. This arduous 
position is exemplified by the frustrations of the Muslim political elite. 
 
“But must our position be always different from the Government's, for it to be credible 
or to show leadership?”  
Abdullah Tarmugi, Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs, 9 February 2002, Straits Times 
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To show how the concern of the ummah can translate into local dilemmas, let 
us take for example the issue of the visit of the Israeli delegation which the elites cite 
during interviews. In 1990, a group of Malay/Muslim professionals organized an 
unprecedented national convention of Malay/Muslim professionals to discuss the 
state and position of their community in Singapore. The participants at the convention 
felt that the Malays/Muslims were still not part of the wider Singapore society. 
Numerous issues that led to the questioning of their loyalty surfaced during the time. 
The first was the state visit of President Chaim Herzog of Israel in 1986, which was 
brought up during an interview with the President of the AMP. Second, was the low 
support for the PAP in the 1988 election (Straits Times, 26 Sept 1988). The 
professionals also called for the depoliticization of Mendaki to allow the leadership of 
the organization to be held by individuals who may be highly qualified and competent 
but who were not politicians (Ismail and Elinah, 2000:57-58).  
 
The Problem of the Vulnerable Mass 
 As we are about to see, there exist a close affinity between the Media Elites 
and the State Elites. Hence, the most logical question to ask is what explains it? 
Here, the argument of Chan about politics under the administrative state as primarily 
taking place via the newspaper columns seems to gain resonance. 
 
In writing The Power Elite (1959), C. Wright Mills described a process of 
change through which a society of publics is giving way to a mass society (Chapter 
13). A society of publics is one in which there is a two-way flow of communication 
between governing elite and citizenry, and the opinions of citizens are based on their 
own direct experiences of social reality. In addition, opinion is not passive, but is 
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realized in social actions. Mass society has the opposite characteristics- one way 
communication, elite-guided understanding and passive opinion. 
 
Since the Berita Minggu is the Sunday edition of the Berita Harian weekly, I 
will not make a distinction between the two. It seems that the Berita Harian, the 
Malay national paper, makes fertile ground for the incorporating of new blood into 
positions of state political elites. The close relationship between the state and the 
Malay/Muslim journalists can be traced back to the pioneer batch of PAP Malay MPs 
such as Othman Wok (1946-1963 Utusan Melayu) and even the first Prime Minister 
of Singapore, Yusof Ishak. 
Table 1: Snapshot of Muslim Members of Parliament in 2001 
PAP MP Year Former GLC Position 
Zainul Abideen 
Rasheed 







Journalist, Assistant to Editor of Berita Harian/ 
Berita Minggu 
Chief Reporter 
Yatiman Yusof 1978-1984 Journalist, Editor of Berita Harian and Berita 
Minggu 
Abdullah Tarmugi 1980-1982 
1982-1984 
Leader/Feature Writer, The Straits Times 
Associate News, Editor of The Straits Times 
Hawazi Daipi 1983-1997 Senior Leader/ Feature Writer Special Assistant 
Editor of Berita Harian (SPH Unit) 
 
There are two possible explanations as to why we see a host of journalists 
especially amongst the Berita Harian joining the PAP as Malay/Muslim Members of 
Parliament (MP). The first makes a reference to the social network theory but it has 
its problems. It assumes that once there is a link made between the PAP MPs and 
the journalists of say Berita Harian, these elites through their social networks brought 
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their friends, colleagues and subordinates over. The reason why so many of the 
political elites come from the Berita Harian could be simply because they know each 
other. This is alluded to by an informant during the course of a discussion. However, 
this does not explain why the link is made in the first place or why this link is allowed 
to continue, sustain and replenish itself. The second reason makes a reference to 
journalists as the information nodes of society. The nature of their jobs require them 
to be grounded hence it is assumed that they are very much familiar and sensitive to 
the shifts in public sentiments. 






































11% 13% 3.5% 4.5% 
Source: Kau Ah Keng, Jung Kwon, Tambyah Siok Kuan and Tan Soo Jiuan, Understanding 
Singaporeans: Values, Lifestyles, Aspirations and Consumption Behaviours (Singapore: World 
Scientific, 2004), pp. 82-89. 
 
Between 1996-2001, the Berita Harian has lost nearly half of its readers. And 
it seems to gain more resonance amongst the older generation, the lower educated 
and those in the lower income bracket. It is obvious for one and all that the Malay 




Impact of the Knowledge-Based Economy on the Muslim Power Elites 
The impact of the Knowledge-based economy is most apparent in the sphere 
of the political elites. Here, we can see the interplay between Pareto’s economic 
interest, public sentiments and the circulation of elites. Singapore’s economic 
interests have seen the nation embark on a knowledge-based economy. At the same 
time, the rising level of education amongst the Singapore population has seen a shift 
of public sentiments towards professions which society has ascribed as prestigious, 
and as to who is seen as educated and learned. What is seen as prestigious is a fluid 
concept and it shifts from time to time according to the economic climate and public 
perception.  
 
It can be seen that Muslim elites who is seen to be coming from the “lower 
hierarchy” in the professional ladder for example teachers are a thing of the past. 
Non-professionals making it as political elites are today unthinkable. Those holding 
Doctorate degrees and medical doctors for example Yaacob Ibrahim, Maliki Osman 
and Fatimah Lateef are examples of this reshaping of the image of the Muslim power 
elites. In the past, there was not the trend of Malay Phd holders joining politics, the 
PAP specifically. Maybe, we can name one Ahmad Mattar who in the 1970s was a 
lecturer in the field of Building Science at the National University of Singapore. But 
today we see a trend that being doctors either by doing PhDs or studying medicine 
could be a route towards a political career. The recent national elections of May 2006 
saw two more Muslim doctors enter into Parliament, one a lecturer in Real estate in 
NUS, and the other a medical doctor. This is not proportional to the political elites 
having doctorates that we see amongst the Chinese and Indian communities.  
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Table 3: Snapshot of Muslim Members of Parliament in 2006 
Members of Parliament  
Abdullah Tarmugi Speaker 
MP for East Coast 
Assistant Prof Mohamad Maliki Osman Parliamentary Secretary, National Development 
MP for Sembawang 
Assistant Prof Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim MP for Marine Parade 
Assoc/Prof Yaacob Ibrahim Minister for the Environment and Water Resources 
Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs 
MP for Jalan Besar 
Dr Ahmad Md Magad MP for Pasir Ris-Punggol 
Dr Fatimah Lateef MP for Marine Parade 
Halimah Yacob MP for Jurong 
Hawazi Daipi  Senior Parliamentary Secretary , Manpower 
MP for Sembawang 
Masagos Zukilfli Senior Parliamentary Secretary, Education 
MP for Tampines 
Zainudin Nordin Mayor Central District 
MP for Bishan-Toa Payoh 
Zainul Abidin Rasheed Senior Minister of State, Foreign Affairs 
Mayor of North East District 
MP for Aljunied 
Zaqy Mohamad MP for Hong Kah 
 
Musical Chairs: Chains of Matchmaking 
The common explanation for the introduction of the Malay elites into the 
perceived establishment elites, power elites in positions of influence in government 
set up and government linked institutions, is that of cooptation. This is where I feel 
the analogy of the musical chairs proves superior to the common language of 
cooptation for one could be co-opted into the system once but this does not explain 
the individual’s movements as he traverses the “approved societal institutions”. For 
surely as one moves from being President of Mendaki to President of MUIS and then 
to PAP MP, we cannot say that the individual has been co-opted and then co-opted 
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again. Hence the language of cooptation does not suffice in accounting for the 
formation of the Muslim elites. 
 
In trying to determine what the laws are which determine these general 
circumstances, Harrison White posits that in a coordinated system, consider a job D, 
from which a man, E, leaves; and a job, R, left by a man, F, who will eventually 
replace E in job D. The departure of F may well precede the departure of E, or it can 
coincide or follow. Both the vacancy period in a job and the period a man spends in 
limbo between incumbencies are substantial and of the same size on the average. It 
is therefore implausible to speak of a flow of causation. When the music starts 
everyone gets up and circulates; all “men” are in limbo and all “jobs” vacant. 
Everyone scrambles when the music stops, no central person directs the flow. And 
as a result, some men are left over. 
 
I wish to keep the musical chairs analogy as it is a useful analogy. To 
accommodate for this, a few modifications and tweaking need to be made to make 
sense of the Singapore context. The limbo in the Singapore case is almost non-
existent and the scramble is not actually random or chaotic. It seems as if everyone 
knows where exactly he or she is going to be sitting next. It almost seems like a fixed 
musical chairs game. Even those leaving due to a shortage of seats leave without a 
whimper. However, the pertinent questions that I am asking are who gets to scramble 
for these positions and who is excluded from the game and who is playing the music? 
For the last question, I will refrain from sliding into the premature conclusion that the 
state is entirely responsible for pulling the strings.  
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Table 4: Tracing Muslim Political Elites in Various Institutions since Year 2000 
PAP MP Berita Harian AMP NUS MUIS 
 Yatiman Yusof 
 Abdullah 
Tarmugi 
 Zainul Abideen 
Rasheed 
 Dr. Yaacob 
Ibrahim 
 Halimah Yacob 
 Dr. Mohamad 
Maliki Osman 
 Yatiman Yusof 




 Zainul Abideen 
Rasheed 
 Mohd Alami 
Musa 
 Yang Razali 
Kassim 
 Dr. Yaacob 
Ibrahim 




 Zainul Abideen 
Rasheed 








 Alami Musa 
MENDAKI Muhammadiyah NTUC PERGAS Perdaus 




 Dr. Yaacob 
Ibrahim 
 Ahmad Khalis 
A. Ghani 
 Halimah Yacob 




 Ustaz Syed 
Abdillah 







There is now also a trend towards incorporating leaders from non-
governmental grassroots organizations. Take for example, the lawyer Ahmad Khalis 
who was the former Secretary-General of Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyah is a 
religious and welfare organization in Singapore that provides social services to the 
community which includes a madrasah, a welfare home, a health care centre, a 
kindergarten, a child care centre, a travel agency and a restaurant. The recent entry 
of Perdaus President, Masagos, further cements this point. However, being a leader 
of a social organization does not negate the fact that an excellent educational 





The Intellectual Elites? 
There is this ambiguous category of the intellectual elites such as the elites of 
philosophers, writers, journalists, scientists etc that potentially exist and envelopes 
the categories of the religious, social and political elites. Do the intellectual elites only 
serve merely a cerebral function? However, it seems that the important role of the 
intellectual elites is greatly enhanced in a democratic society.  In a country ruled by a 
single monolithic and maximally totalitarian elite, all decisions may be deemed as 
political decisions. 
 
  A fundamental assumption I am going to make in this thesis is that the critical 
intellectual has an important political role to play. Here, one gets into the rather sticky 
area of trying to define who the intellectual is. The debate is characterized by two 
rather extreme points of view. Gramsci wrote in his Prison Notebooks that “all men 
are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the function 
of intellectuals.” Benda’s renowned definition of intellectuals on the other hand had 
them as a tiny band of super-gifted and morally endowed philosopher kings who 
constitute the conscience of mankind. This point can perhaps be more clearly 
illuminated by examining a group of people DuBois called the Talented Tenth. The 
real intellectuals, according to Benda, are “those whose activity is essentially not the 
pursuit of practical aims, all those who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a 
science or metaphysical speculation, in short in the possession of non-material 
advantages, and hence in a certain manner say: ‘My kingdom is not of this world.’” In 
Revolt of the Elites, Lasch launched scathing attacks on “political correctness”. 
Intellectuals and artists sit in a precarious position on society, between 
''disinterestedness'' (typical of poor artists and grad students) and ''high values'' 
(typical of elites). It is not my intention to classify the intellectual elites as a mutually 
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exclusive category. They can in fact exist within the categories of the social, religious 
and political elites. However, this thesis is not the place to debate this issue in great 
detail. 
 
It can be clearly seen in this chapter, the contrast in the fluidity of movements 
within the various structures of the power elite. Within the political elite, there is some 
form of movement amongst select organizations which is expanding into the social 
realm and one can see recruitment along certain criteria of which excellent academic 
qualifications stands out. As such, certain professions such as journalists and 
teachers have ceased to function as fertile grounds for fertile recruitment (Straits 
Times, April 19 2006) paving the way for a highly educated class made up of 
academics and doctors. Amongst the social elites, one observes a lack of 
regeneration manifest in the phenomenon of the Chairman Sampai Mati. One sees a 
situation whereby these elites have held office for a great number of years. Whereas 
with the religious elites, there is this whole ambiguity about who constitutes the 





In this Chapter, I will seek to demonstrate how elite function impact political 
outcomes. By looking at a few issues that are of concern to the Muslim community of 
late, the thesis will map out who aligns with who and on what. In order to explicate 
how the elite functions, I will demonstrate the interdependence of the various elites 
and between elites and the non-elite population. This necessitates a discussion of the 
various factors that enhance and impede 1) cohesion within the various elites 2) 
cohesion between the elites and the Muslim community 3) cohesion between the 
Muslim community and the larger Singapore society. It is my argument that whilst 
there are factors that have enhanced elite cohesion over the years, there still remain 
lingering factors that have led to fault lines forming both within and around the Muslim 
community. 
 
Impact of Global Processes: The Significance of 9/11 
It was apparent during fieldwork that global events have resulted in great 
ramifications to the local Muslim community. One event that has inevitably affected 
social relations in Singapore is the terrorist attack of 9/11. There is no doubting that 
the Muslim community was adversely affected as a result of the attacks. The 
discovery of the Jemaah Islamiah cell group and the subsequent arrests puts the 
Muslim community in the spotlight. However, things took a significant turn in the 
relationship of the elites after 9/11. Many members of the elite interviewed cited 9/11 





However, from the interviews conducted, it was gathered that elite cohesion 
has taken a few steps towards greater cohesion in the last five years. I argue that this 
can be attributed to two factors, one reactionary, and the other proactive. The Muslim 
elites interviewed in general have singled out the terror attacks as the main catalyst 
for elite cohesion in the past five years. They feel that the attacks have galvanized 
the diverse elite groups in coming out in unison denouncing terrorism as un-Islamic. 
In what would seem like a cruel irony, the unfortunate event of 9/11 could be a 
blessing in disguise for Muslim elite relations in Singapore. All the elites interviewed 
felt that as a result, there was greater solidarity as the community reacted to make its 
stand clear against terrorism and the taking away of innocent lives. This leads to a 
conclusion that ‘elite pluralism’ does not prevent the separate elites from possessing 
a high degree of cohesion and solidarity, with common interests and common 
purposes which far transcend their specific differences and disagreements. 
 
Proactive 
It was evident during the course of interviews that personalities matter very 
much. To have a Minister-in-charge of religious affairs in Singapore is an anomaly. 
Only Islam has spearheading its religion, a minister. Therefore, the logical question to 
ask then will be what is the role and function of this minister? Quite a number of the 
elites interviewed acknowledged the effective role of the current Minister of Muslim 
Affairs. What is generally the sentiment amongst many of the informants is the feel 
good factor that has been brought about by Yaacob Ibrahim’s coming to office as the 
Minister of Muslim Affairs. The President of a Muslim organization commented that 
things are better now in the sense that the Minister is seen to be more to “the field”. 
As in the Minister comes down to the ground to mix around more with the people. 
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Another prominent leader also alluded to the fact that things are better now due to 
the strong personality of the Minister.  
 
Even though the solidarity amongst the elites has taken a few steps towards a 
positive direction, there is still a cry from Muslim elites of various organizations for 
greater elite cohesion. This is exemplified by the statement made by Haji Abu Bakar 
bin Haji Hashim, the Syariah Court President when he said that "The time has come 
for all Muslim organisations to plan and work together in helping the community" 
praising the social elites of AMP and the religious elites of PERGAS for initiatives to 
work together. Both AMP and PERGAS recognized the value of working together. 
PERGAS president, Haji Ali Mohd said that it was a good idea for Muslim 
professionals and religious teachers to work together. Mr Yang Razali wanted to 
involve religious teachers in its plan to help the Malay and Muslim community as they 
were highly respected. "Their potential as social trouble-shooters is high, but they 
have so far focused largely on religious instruction," he said (Straits Times, 3 May 
1992). 
 
The religious elites too feel the need to bridge the gap between themselves 
and the political elites (Straits Times, 15 April 2000). However, there exists a sense 
of powerless on the part of the religious elites in a sense that they feel that they have 
to wait for an invitation from Malay MPs to a public dialogue. Hence, the presence of 
a strong leader is much welcomed by the elites. However, during an interview, an 
elite also warned that having a strong leader could also lead to overexposure and to 




Theory of Weak Links 
This brings us to the fact about the degree of separation in Singapore 
between the state, the organizations and the people. The degree of separation can 
be argued to be very narrow. In a society characterized by a soft authoritarian 
system, once a directive is passed from the top, the rest will have to follow in a trickle 
down effect. There are no weak links as far as the state mechanism is concerned. I 
will argue also that this is due to the nature and the way these organizations are run. 
Centred on a personality (the Chairmen Sampai Mati) with a firm grasp of their 
respective institutions, facilitates the flow of instructions from the top. From the 
Ministry of Muslim Affairs to the governmental organizations like MUIS and Mendaki 
to the various social organizations who quite a number of them have a vested interest 
in the state owing to one reason or another, usually due to funding by the state. I will 
get back to this issue of funding in the next Chapter. 
  
It became apparent after interviewing members of the Muslim power elites 
that they view the Prime Ministership of Goh Chok Tong as a breakthrough for the 
Muslim community in Singapore. A lot of it was put down to his consultative and 
accommodating style of leadership. However, the jury is still out on current Prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong.  
 
The various Muslim elites collide on various planes; the ideological, the 
political, the racial and at the level of personal characteristics. As mentioned in the 
section above on Straddling the Nation and the Community, in the political plane, it 
was discovered that other Muslim elites still have some reservations when it comes 
to dealing with the political elites, namely the PAP MPs. In one organization where 
one of its prominent members has made PAP MP, working relations have been 
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totally cut off. When asked why this was the case, the President said that it was not 
his decision. In fact the President claimed that he wanted to continue to have a 
working relationship with his former member, now a political elite, as it would facilitate 
and boost the activities in his organization but to objections from members of his 
Board. The feeling of an “us” versus “them” still exists when it comes to dealing with 
the political elite. And the consensus view taken by the organization is not to have 
anything to do with the political party. 
 
On the ideological plane, the difference is most apparent in the field of 
religious orientation. The “extremes” would for example leave in the midst of a 
meeting to answer a prayer call much to the dislike of the “moderates” and the 
“progressives”. A religious elite, in an interview lamented the fact that there is 
unequal representation in the MUIS council between the religious elites and the rest 
of the elites. This under-representation of the religious elites would inadvertently 
affect policy-making decisions which would affect the Muslim community at large. 
However, the other elites do not subscribe to this line of thought. A former President 
of MUIS argued that this concern gives an impression that the rest of the elites were 
working against Islam and the Muslim community. As all the elites should actually be 
working towards a common good, he did not see any reason to fret.  
 
It is evident from the above example that there exists a clash in ideology and 
orientation or at the very least, a perceived clash in ideology and orientation. I will 
argue that at times, this “clash” in ideology is indeed imaginary and a matter of 
perception. A perceived or imaginary “clash” that manifests itself into a real 
consequence. In this case, the “three Cs”- group consciousness, cohesion, and 
conspiracy that characterized the elites has led to a breakdown in elite relations. 
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The Collapse of the Racial Category?  
On the racial plane, the President of a local Muslim organization observed 
that there is still a divide not only in the community but in his organization based on 
race. This is quite contrary to established literature on the collapsible nature of the 
identity of the Malays when it comes to Islam. As in it is easier to “masuk Melayu” 
(become a Malay) if one embraces Islam (Purushotam, 1998:151-153). This is 
somewhat counter intuitive as current literature points to the fact that the ethnicity of 
the Malays have somewhat become synonymous with that of being Muslim, speaking 
Malay and practicing Malay culture. There are arguments that if this is such, then 
Arabs, Indians and people of other races could also be deemed as Malay. But this 
case clearly points to the contrary. He observed that at some level the Malay Muslims 
are still not integrating with the Indian Muslims and so on and this affects their 
working relationship. There are even instances whereby marriage between Muslims 
also runs into problems on the basis of race. As an extension of this point, there are 
cases whereby people question the race of the Muslim elites in Singapore. This 
particular piece of data presented above warrants a conscious effort to disentangle 
the Malay/Muslim “truism” that is commonly used in the Singapore context. 
 
However this does not sufficiently explain a more than subtle peculiarity. Why 
do categories of race only collapse when it comes to the Muslim community? With 
the entanglement of the Malay/Muslim category, it presupposes and institutionalizes 
religion as the overriding category over race when it comes to the Muslims in 
Singapore. This is unheard of in all fields and domains of life in Singapore as racial 
categories pervade and permeates all facets of community life. These translate into 
special circumstances and criterion for the selection of leaders in the Muslim 
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community. What are the implications of such a situation for the Muslim power elites 
in Singapore? 
 
Fractions and Cohesion amongst the Muslim Power Elites 
“Insofar as the structural clue to the power elite today lies in the political order, 
that clue is the decline of politics as genuine and public debates of alternative 
decisions…” (Mills, 1959:224).  “More and more of the fundamental issues never 
came to any point of decision before Congress… much less before the electorate” 
(Mills, 1959:255). However, I will argue here that those issues are being contested in 
the public realm. The only way we can evaluate how cohesive the Muslim power 
elites are and whether there is any centralization of power is to hinge it upon what the 
power elite do with their power. This leads us to the problem of who unites with whom 
on what. I will bring forth two recent issues that have seen the elites align themselves 
against and with one another. 
 
The Tudung Issue  
The religious elites released a press statement expressing their worry and 
concern that if issues which are regarded as important by the Muslims such as the 
Tudung Issue9, which is a specific requirement for Muslim girls who have attained the 
age of puberty, are not resolved, a section of Singaporeans may become 
disillusioned with the concept of freedom of religious practices in Singapore. 
 
The term tudung needs to be contextualized within Singapore. It is not the veil 
that covers most of the face. Rather, it is the contemporary Muslim hijab or 
                                                 
9
 The debate began early in 2002, when four Muslim parents' insistence on sending their children to 
school wearing the tudung, or headscarf, prompted a confrontation with the authorities (Straits Times 
Oct 30 2002). The end result was as swift as it was certain. The four girls were suspended from school.  
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sometimes termed the headscarf, that leaves the face uncovered. The tudung in 
recent times have been the subject of much debate. It is a battleground for the 
armies of those who are out to purify Islam or demonize it. In Morocco (Wearing the 
Hijab in Contemporary Morocco: Choice and Identity), Tunisia (Cultural Diversity 
within Islam: Veils and Laws in Tunisia), Iran (Power, Ideology, and Women’s 
Consciousness in Postrevolutionary Iran), Turkey (On Changing the Concept and 
Position of Persian Women), Thailand (The life of this world: negotiated Muslims lives 
in Thai society), and most recently France this is very much the case. The fear of the 
veil being used as tool for political upheaval or a point of contention for feminist 
debates have done much to fuel this sentiment. 
 
Because of the concept of the Muslim ummah, happenings in a particular 
country get picked up by Muslims from other countries. The tudung issue in 
Singapore has sparked off many discussions and comments from scholars all over 
the world. In Malaysia, on 8 February 2002, some seventy students gathered outside 
the Singapore High Commission in Kuala Lumpur to protest against Singapore’s ban 
on schoolgirls donning the tudung (Straits Times, 9 February 2002). 
 
Whilst the state has branded the Muslims who fought for the Tudung Issue as 
political (Straits Times, 3 February 2002) and with the Muslim political elites jumping 
on the bandwagon of the state (Straits Times, 7 February 2002, 9 Feb 2002) alleging 
that the protagonists in the issue are not clear about Islam, the religious elites have 
lend their weight to the protagonists. PERGAS president, Mr Syed Abdillah Ahmad 
Al-Jufri, said that the request by the Muslim community was rejected by Mr Goh who 
"inadvertently restricted" the opportunity for Singaporeans to experience, from young, 
the true meaning of living and interacting with others of different races and religions 
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(Straits Times, 21 May 2000).They have stated that in the cases of the four families 
of the four school-going children involved in the issue, their action stems from their 
sincere desire to practice and inculcate moral values in their children (PERGAS, 
2004:344). 
 
Members of the religious elite alleged that the handling of this issue by the 
state has already caused dissatisfaction and if not resolved amicably and 
convincingly would lead to mistrust between the various groups implying that the 
state rhetoric of strengthening social cohesion (amongst the races) is at risk of only 
being seen as slogan chanting. The members of the religious elite warned against 
looking at the concern of a minority group just on the basis of numbers with the 
excuse that the state has to look into the interest and the well being of the majority 
(PERGAS, 2004:337). This might lead to a tyranny of the majority kind of rule 
whereby members of a parliament, supported by and representing a majority, can 
pass laws restricting the rights of ethnic and other minorities (Vasil, 2004:54). 
 
The Casino Issue 
Although many independent Malay/Muslim organizations for example 
Jamiyah, PERGAS, Perdaus, Pertapis and Majlis Pusat are institutional members of 
Mendaki, allowing the latter some latitude and leverage over these organizations 
(Straits Times, 6 November 2000, Tan, 2004:83), the casino issue shows that there is 
more dissent than the Muslim community and the state would like to admit. In a press 
release, that reflected the views of seven Muslim organizations, namely the 
Association of Muslim Professionals, Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious 
Teachers Association (PERGAS), Centre for Contemporary Islamic Studies, Islamic 
Fellowship Association, Ain Society, Prophet Muhammad Birthday Memorial 
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Scholarship Fund Board and Majlis Pusat, the organizations unanimously voiced their 
disagreement to the casino project (Straits Times, 15 January 2005) arguing that the 
government’s decision to build a casino is based largely on economic reasons at the 
expense of negative social repercussions. 
 
Hence, although it has been argued that state created organizations (MUIS 
and Mendaki) actually have leverage over these Muslim organizations, they do 
actually have room to organize and mobilize themselves. And it will actually be 
misleading and foolish to only focus and jump at whether these organizations at the 
end of the day got their way. For each and every of these organizations actually 
represent the views of a sizeable and significant proportion of the Muslim community. 
 
To further demonstrate how elite function impact political outcomes, it 
necessitates a discussion of the issue of trust and loyalty as it illuminates 1) cohesion 
within the various elites 2) cohesion between the elites and the Muslim community 3) 
cohesion between the Muslim community and the larger Singapore society. The 
following paragraphs will highlight the interplay between these three factors. 
 
The Question of Malay/Muslim Loyalty and the Question of Trust 
It is my contention that as long as the question of Malay/Muslim loyalty exists, 
the Muslim community will never be fully integrated into the larger society. 
Furthermore, it will leave the Muslim community vulnerable to elite politics as the 
elites position themselves on either sides of the debate arguing the greater good of 
their people. The issue of Malay/Muslim loyalty is indeed multi-faceted in nature. I will 
attempt to dissect the complex and intricate nature of these relationships.  
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First of all, at the level of state and the Malay/Muslim community, there exists 
the state’s continuous apprehension and the suspicion towards the community that 
have been well documented. Then, fracture exists at the level of the Muslim elites 
and the state as some amongst the Muslim elites who position themselves on the 
side of the state are hoping to get on the musical chairs ride. There are those who 
are torn in between the state and the community, trying to straddle the two. Amongst 
these are those who want to “change from within” and propound the analogy of 
“platforms” and “using many hats”. There also exist the few who are fiercely partisan 
to the community. These few are often deemed unrealistic and insensitive to the 
conditions of the time, which is living as a minority in a multiracial and multireligious 
country. 
 
All these trickle down and manifest itself in the dilemma faced by the 
community: the question of who to trust amongst the Muslim elites and who they 
want to represent them. It is my argument that as long as there is distrust between 
the state and the Muslim community, relationships will always remain tenuous both at 
the level of state-community, inter-community (between Malays, Chinese, Indians 
and Others) and intra-community (within the Malay/Muslim community). The problem 
is that the Muslim elites are then forced to position themselves along the battle lines 
that have been drawn. 
  
There are numerous issues that highlight the question of Malay loyalty in 
Singapore over the past four decades of Singapore’s independence. I will just 
highlight two of the issues. One refers to a recent example and another, an ever-
present issue that has plagued Singapore society for decades. 
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The War in Iraq 
Nine Muslim organizations voiced their unease at the American-waged war in 
Iraq, distancing themselves from the government and other government-linked 
Muslim organizations, and causing concern within some quarters (Straits Times, 14 
April 2003). The statement reflecting the views of the Muslim ground came from the 
Prophet Muhammad Birthday Memorial Scholarship Fund Board (LBKM); Association 
of Muslim Professionals (AMP); Centre For Contemporary Islamic Studies (CCIS); 
Islamic Fellowship Association; Perdaus; Young Women Muslim Association (PPIS); 
Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association (PERGAS); Taman 
Bacaan; and United Indian Muslim Association (Straits Times, 26 April 2003). The 
committee's chairman, Mr Wan Hussin Zoohri, a former MP, said that the 
organizations wished to register “the silent disquiet on the ground”. This followed the 
statement by four organisations - Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious 
Teachers' Association (PERGAS); Perdaus, a volunteer welfare group; the 
Muhammadiyah Association, which runs religious classes, welfare homes and care 
centres for the elderly; and the Centre for Contemporary Islamic Studies – who seven 
months before, jointly issued a statement calling on the Government not to support a 
United States attack on Iraq (Straits Times, 5, 7, 15 September 2002). 
 
There was also a Straits Times survey that brought Malay loyalty to the fore 
that ends up showing that most Malays consistently did not support the war against 
Iraq whereas most Chinese did (Straits Times, 27 January, 9 February 1991). But 
more importantly, the unhappiness of the Muslim community was used to question 
their loyalty to the Singapore state. And as such, an issue that has plagued 
Singapore society ever since its inception resurfaced. The loyalty of the Muslims 
towards the nation was questioned (Straits Times, 15 September 2002). 
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Malays in the Army 
In probably his farewell speech, Yatiman Yusof a PAP Member of Parliament 
cited one significant change as the enlistment of Malays for national service. In the 
early years of Singapore's independence, many were not called up for security 
reasons, “Now our younger people have served NS, meritocracy is a well-accepted 
philosophy, and Singaporeans, regardless of their race, language or religion, are 
given opportunities to achieve their highest potential through education, through 
employment, through engagement in whatever profession they pursue” (Straits 
Times, 25 March 2006). 
 
The state also broached the question of the co-relation between low Malay 
involvement in the Singapore Armed Forces and its distrust of their ability to fight 
against other Malays on behalf of the Chinese (ST, 23 February, 6 April, 18 May 
1987). In 1992, 27 years after Singapore gained independence, the Republic of 
Singapore Air Force saw its first Malay-Muslim pilot earn his wings. No statistics are 
readily available but it is common knowledge that almost two decades on, there is an 
overrepresentation of the Malay population drafted into the Singapore Police Force 
and the Singapore Civil Defense (Tan, 2004:81-82). However, Tan posits that the 
Malay-Muslim leadership is clearly the preserve of the ruling party’s MPs (Tan, 
2004:83) which clashes with the main thesis of this study. 
If, for instance, you put in a Malay officer who is very religious and who has family ties 
in Malaysia in charge of a machine gun unit, that’s a very tricky business. We’ve got to 
know his background. I’m saying these things because they are real, and if I don’t think 
that, and I think even if today, the Prime Minister doesn’t think carefully about this, we 
could have a tragedy. 
Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, 29 September 1999, Straits Times 
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The statement raised a furor amongst the Malay-Muslim community with two 
groups, Taman Bacaan, a grassroots group and Majlis Pusat, the central organizing 
body for thirty-eight Malay-Muslim cultural bodies asking for a dialogue with the 
Senior Minister. They were duly brushed aside by the then Minister-in-charge of 
Muslim Affairs, Abdullah Tarmugi who instead asked such energies to be put into 
preparing the community for a knowledge-based economy (Chan, 2000:265). 
 
Malays have been told that they should work harder on learning English and 
that, according to Lee Kuan Yew, the answer to Malay boys’ underachievement is 
more parental discipline (Straits Times, 25 August, 13 October 1990). Educated 
Malay boys because of being drafted into the Singapore Police Force and the 
Singapore Civil Defense will remain as junior officers as only those who are drafted 
into the Singapore Armed Forces can make senior officers in the National Service. 
Senior officers from the Singapore Police Force and the Singapore Civil Defense 
during National Service, come from the Singapore Armed Forces. 
 
The question remains as to how the Malays/Muslims are weaved into the 
rhetoric of multiracialism, multireligosity and meritocracy in Singapore. Here, the point 
about the Muslims being characterized by a community still struggling to integrate 
into the larger Singapore society already characterized by an organic form of 
solidarity can be argued to be impeded by the state. Through means of exclusion of 
the community from the larger society, its lack of integration is maintained by the 
regulation of the state. Hence, the Malays/Muslims either by their own discretion or 
through the lack of choice looks for solace amongst their own kind. At the same time, 
the state supplements this by highlighting the insular nature of the community. This is 
manifested by the fact that in spite of strategic differentiations, the public perception 
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is that Malay/Muslims in Singapore are increasingly becoming a closed community 
deeply protective of its culture, language, lifestyle, and religion with Islam regarded 
by the Malays as a necessary aspect of their identity (Tan, 2003:245). 
 
The Rhetoric of Cooptation/Altruism 
I have intentionally conflated the two words together due to the sheer 
impossibility of discerning between the two. During the course of my fieldwork, I was 
faced with the ambiguity of these two categories. Trying to separate the two will 
merely lead one to the realm of the presumptuous. There are many similar 
statements that I encountered whenever I meet up with elites who have switched to 
government linked organizations. Qualifications such as, “the organization is just 
another platform for me to carry out what I do”, “I have not changed, I’m just using a 
different platform” are in abundance.  
 
When asked, why these elites switch to an organization that is so different, 
even at times contradictory and conflicting to their previous organization, the elites 
will talk about roles. Here, the common rhetoric amongst the various elites is one of 
“wearing many hats” or that of “platforms” and that they can fulfill certain roles that 
they do not think can be carried out by others.  
 
C. Wright Mills in his chapter on The Higher Immorality countered this 
perception of the benevolent selfless elites. He posits that the men of the higher 
circles are not representative men and that their high position is not a result of moral 
virtue, much in contrast with the PAP government’s Confucian way of looking at 
leadership. He was also less optimistic about meritocracy being the cornerstone of 
the ruling class. He does not attribute their success to meritorious ability.  
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“Those who sit in the seat of the high and mighty are selected and formed by the 
means of power, the success of wealth, the mechanics of celebrity, which prevail in 
their society. They are not men selected and formed by a civil service that is linked with 
the world of knowledge and sensibility. They are not men shaped by nationally 
responsible parties that debate openly and clearly the issues this nation now so 
unintelligently confronts. They are not men held in responsible check by a plurality of 
voluntary associations which connect debating publics with the pinnacles of decision. 
Commanders of power unequaled in human history, they have succeeded within the 
American system of organized irresponsibility (Mills, 1959:361)." 
 
A few of the Muslim elites do realize this problem and they locate the problem 
in the fact that their organizations are receiving funds from the state. The President of 
one local organization in Singapore revealed that he needs a few million dollars a 
year to run his organization. As such, his organization is working with various 
governmental ministries such as the Ministry of Community Development, the 
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education and secures funding from the state 
for the day to day running of their activities. 
 
Of Continuity and Change 
A paradox can be clearly seen when talking to most of the Muslim elites: the 
paradox of distanciation and continuity. One can often hear the elites distancing 
themselves from their predecessors in the organization. That they are not like their 
predecessors and that they are different. They are not as narrow and how they have 
done things differently. Most of the elites, especially those in governmental and 
government linked organizations, when talking about the history and genealogy of 
leaders in their organization, will go through great lengths trying to distance 
themselves from their predecessors. They would say stuff like, “I would not have 
done it that way” and “That was a mistake”. However, when talking about the future, 
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continuity was almost always emphasized. There will be talk about leaving a legacy, 
how certain things that have been done have to be maintained. 
 
The Reluctant Leader 
If according to Weber, leaders derive their influence from the realm of 
tradition, charisma and the rational-legal domain, I will like to posit that in the case of 
the Muslim power elites in Singapore, one particular trait comes out very strongly and 
needs to be analyzed and unpacked with greater detail and care: reluctance. It is 
often the case during interviews that leaders preach reluctance in accepting the post 
of a power elite. The professed reason for their initial reluctance could range anything 
from self-doubt due to past experiences, to questioning one’s own abilities due to a 
perceived lack of credentials to being thrown off by the sheer magnitude of the 
challenge at hand. I will argue that this reluctance can be used as a deliberate, 
calculated stance deployed by leaders that can be used to their advantage. It gives 
them a lot of leverage in which they can maneuver and also endow them with 
bargaining power. At least two strategic advantages can be delineated. 
 
First of all, their disinterested positioning gives them the moral legitimacy. It 
gives an illusion that they are disinterested and have no vested or personal interest in 
taking up the position and that they are taking the moral high ground in agreeing to 
take up the position and are accepting out of a sense of duty, answering “the calling”, 
rather then out of selfish ambitions. Secondly, it gives the leaders room to make 
mistakes. Worse still, they do not have to be apologetic about it since in the first 
place, they have been “coerced” and “coaxed” into accepting those positions. 
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However, there is an inherent contradiction here. This stance of being a 
Reluctant Leader comes into direct conflict with the phenomenon of Chairman 
Sampai Mati (Chairman Till Death) that is evident in studying the Singapore Muslims 
power elites. The language of reluctance becomes shaky if put against the fact that 
these elites have been holding the reigns of their respective organizations for years, 
even decades. It is true that religious and secular histories are full of examples of 
great reluctant leaders. In the case of the Muslim Power Elites, it can even be argued 
that this reluctance has religious undertones.  
 
During the course of conducting interviews, there are certain traits and ways 
of arguing of the Muslim elites within the various groupings of the social, religious and 
political elites that become apparent. 
A contradiction to the system appears unthinkable (Cooper, 2004:16-18) 
• What does not fit into the system remain unseen; 
• alternatively, if it is noticed, either it is kept secret, or 
• Laborious efforts are made to explain an exception in terms that do 
not contradict the system. 
• Despite the legitimate claims of contradictory views, one tends to see, 
describe, or even illustrate those circumstances which corroborate 
current views and thereby give them substance, 
 
In Les Systemes socialistes, Pareto was convinced that most of human 
behaviour is motivated and guided by non-logical considerations which are concealed 
by a veneer of ex post facto and false logic which are developed to satisfy a human 
craving for the security of having acted rationally. Hence, this simple recognition 
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means that explanations of behaviour in terms of rationality are based on false 
premises and can only lead to erroneous conclusions. People react to events as they 
are perceived within a system of beliefs rather than as they actually are, therefore, 
ideologies are based on sentiments rather than reason. 
 
To extend this argument further, it explains how practical performance then 
dominates over creative mood, which is reduced to a certain level that is disciplined, 
uniform and discreet. Fleck’s key idea was that “fact” cannot be rendered completely 
free from “point of view”. I wish to extend Fleck’s argument further and highlight the 
dual nature of the thought communities- vertical and horizontal. Not only is the 
community built vertically over time with a lineage from past to present but also 
horizontally as in the contemporaneous group members themselves who bring their 
respective capitals into the thought community. 
 
The Reality of Representation and the Representation of Reality 
It is observed when interviews were conducted, that the Muslim elites indulge 
in throwing labels to refer to one another. And the media is quick to propound these 
categories (Straits Times, 26 November 2005). AMP President Yang Razali 
discussed the complexities of immersing ourselves in categorical classifications 
(Straits Times, 18 May 2005). The danger in talking about the Muslim elites in 
Singapore is to frame the issue in terms of categories. There is a lot of literature that 
has framed the discourse on Islam in the form of categorical classifications (Barton, 
2005). As such, due to the hierarchical nature of discourse and its power/knowledge 
production, local Muslim thinkers and writers have also consumed the nature of the 
debate and argued within the perimeters set by the discourse as seen in works such 
as Muslim… moderate… Singaporean (2003) and Moderation in Islam (2004). 
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Social science in constructing the social world realizes that agents are the 
subject of acts of construction of the social world. However, social science also aims 
to describe the social genesis of the principles of construction. More often than not, 
agents in a given social formation do not even share a set of basic perceptual 
schemes which receive the beginnings of objectification in pairs of antagonistic 
adjectives. The ultimate source of this network is the opposition between the 
dominating elite and the dominated mass. These classificatory are organized in polar 
oppositions for example, conservative/liberal, moderate/extreme. Neither side is 
necessarily desirable nor positive, as those deemed to be the other side of the coin 
has never failed to give a negative reading of the other. These schemes are 
particularly applicable to one field but are transferable to others because of all the 
homologies between fields.  
 
During the course of interviews conducted, it became obvious that labels at 
the end of the day do not fit. A President of a local Muslim social organization alluded 
to the fact that most of the people do not even understand the labels that they are 
using. He proceeded in giving a genealogy of thought that traced all the way back to 
the Prophet Muhammad of the term “Wahabbi”, a word which is nowadays seen as a 
pejorative and associated with fundamentalism, extremism and conservatism and 
other more confusing labels. Two religious elites also questioned the “conservative” 
and “traditional” label leveled at them (Aisha, 2006) saying that it depends on how the 
terms are used. 
 
From these few examples, it is clear that the labels that have been attributed 
to certain groups do not fit like gloves. There is a need to transcend the opposition 
between objectivist theories and subjectivist theories. The former tends to identify 
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social classes as discrete groups and the latter reduces the social order to a 
collective classification by aggregating the individual strategies through which social 
actors categorize themselves and others. A classification is defined as much by its 
being-perceived as by its being, by its action as much as by its position in the 
relations of production. Lastly, the individuals' positions in the classification struggles 
depend on their positions in the class structure. 
 
In this Chapter, it is found that due to the globalized world that we live in 
today, international as well as local events do shape and delimit the actions of the 
elites and the local Muslim community as a whole. Events such as the September 11 
attacks, ironically, have enhanced elite cohesion. This factor coupled with the 
presence of a strong leadership style has promoted greater unity amongst the elites. 
This can be argued to be facilitated by 1) the political culture in Singapore 2) the way 
the Muslim social organizations are set up 3) the interdependence of the elites which 
center on the issue of funding for the local Muslim organizations. However, there still 
exist impediments to greater solidarity between the various elites, between elites and 
the non-elite population and between the Muslim community and the larger 
Singapore society. This situation is not helped by the modes of thinking adopted by 
the various elites who amongst other factors indulge in labeling, categorization and 
classification when dealing with one another. This complex situation is made further 
complicated by the general sentiment of distrust of the Singapore government 






A Powerless Power Elite? 
After an extensive exposition of the Muslim power elites in Singapore, it is 
valid for us to reflect upon whether these elites are in the larger scale of things, 
powerful. First, I will set out to locate the Muslim elites within the larger national 
setup. Second, I will address the existing literature on the perceived helplessness of 
the elites. Where is the Muslim power elite vis-à-vis the larger national set up? There 
is a reason why I have called this chapter “the powerless power elite” and not just the 
“powerless elite”. I wish to capture the tension and the seeming irony within available 
literature that seems to locate the Muslim elites in a position of powerlessness. The 
irony being, although the Muslim elites are powerful in their own community, they are 
not so in the larger scheme of things when it comes to the national set up. There are 
numerous arguments brought forth by various sources that seem to locate the 
Muslim power elite in Singapore in a position of helplessness and vulnerability 
weaved around a web of ubiquitous state mechanisms. This anomaly when it comes 
to talking about the Muslim elite can be misleading. 
 
There were also views that in the mid-1970s, some of the Muslim elites 
played no more than the role of vote-getters. Chan mapped out four roles of 
parliamentary politicians in Singapore- 1) that of the technocrat, 2) the mobiliser, 3) 
the Malay vote-getter, and 4) the Chinese-educated intellectual. Amongst the Malay 
vote-getters in the 1970s are a journalist, a religious teacher and a principal of a 
Malay school (Chan, 1976:424-428). This was necessitated by the fact that in the 
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1972 general elections, the PAP met its sternest contestations in the Malay 
constituents from Malay opponents (Government Gazette, v.14, no.82). 
 
Chan posited that a Malay vote-getter has a definite symbolic appeal and role 
in the Singapore context where ethnicity and language are still salient features of 
politics. It can still be argued today that the role of the Muslim elites in parliament has 
remained somewhat of a symbolic. The truth of the matter is there has never been a 
Malay or Muslim Minister (the Minister of Muslim Affairs not withstanding) who has 
been other than the Minister of Environment, (now Minister of Environment and 
Water Resources) and the Minister of Social Affairs (now Minister of Community 
Development and Sports). Hence, it would seem that at first glance, it could certainly 
be argued that the locus of power within the larger national set up does not centre or 
revolve around the Muslim elites. 
 
Peter Chen claimed that only a third of the political elites count as power 
elites (Chen, 1997:12) which discount almost all of the Muslim political elites in 
Singapore. Here, the term political elites have been turned on its head. It does not 
merely deal with the political elites in the sense of politicians but with “elites in 
politics”. This positions a grand total of one Muslim Minister, Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, 
Minister for the Environment and Water Resources and Minister of Muslim Affairs in 
that bracket. In this case, this whole thesis becomes an exercise in futility. In this 
sense, ascribing the term “power elites” becomes subversive and controversial. It 
becomes even paradoxical and oxymoronic; that of a powerless power elite.  
 
In an article Who runs Singapore?, Cherian George and Jason Leow isolated 
Singapore’s top 100-plus officials and examined the changing anatomy of the public 
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sector elite. The PS 100 list is a snapshot of the individuals holding full-time office in 
the executive, the civil service, the uniformed services, statutory boards, and 
government-owned corporations on Jan 1, 1998. Even though the top public sector 
positions had about one-third new faces who were not at the apex of the 
administration in 1993 and in the last five years the top public sector positions are 
well-trodden, with almost two-thirds of the offices occupied by the different people 
(inclusive of lateral transfers), the number of Muslim faces still remain at a premium. 
The average age has gone down. Seven of the twenty-four ministers and ministers of 
state entered in the last five years. They represent a turnover of thirty per cent since 
1993. Political Science lecturer Dr Ho Khai Leong sees this as a way to avoid the 
concentration of power and influence (Straits Times, 26 April 1998). 
 
There are only sixteen from the minority races and they are concentrated in 
certain functions. There are only three Malays/Muslims and all of them hold political 
office: One is a Minister and two are Ministers of State. This is a far cry from the 14% 
Malay population in the country. There are thirteen Indians, but six are on the 
Supreme Court bench. There are no minorities among the chiefs of the uniformed 
services which reiterates the point I made about Mills’ definition of the power elites 
not applying to the Muslim community in Singapore. 
 
One of the reasons to explain the acutely small number of Malay/Muslims 
amongst the ruling elite is due to educational background. I have discussed this issue 
at some length in Chapter 2. To compound this situation is the elitist nature of 
recruitment amongst the ruling elite (Mauzy and Milne, 2002:53-55). The study also 
revealed that high-achieving scholars dominate. More than half have made it through 
the Scholar route and the proportion is rising, as younger individuals rise into the top 
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positions. Thus, among those under 50 - who would have been of A-level age in 1965 
or later - scholars make up three quarters of the list. Already by 1993, there were 
thirteen scholars among the 14 permanent secretaries under the age of 50. The 
success of the scholarship schemes has tended to make PS 100 more 
homogeneous.  
 
The problem with this is dual in nature. Social Reproduction maintains 
inequalities in society due to the transfer of social, economic, cultural capital 
(language). As a result, inequalities perpetuate themselves. Bourdieu posits that 
society is stratified in a way that the dominant class is ''an autonomous space whose 
structure is defined by the distribution of economic and cultural capital among its 
members.'' There are fractions within each class which correspond to different 
lifestyles through the habitus. The habitus is a system of choices that are influenced 
by inherited asset structures. Furthermore, different sets of preferences come from 
systems of dispositions and the social conditions of production which create 
relationships between them (the systems of dispositions).  
 
Secondly, sponsored mobility entails deeper implications. Those sponsored 
must maintain loyalty to the social system that supports it (Tham, 1977:146). This 
brings us to the point made in Chapter 3 about the intellectual elites. Benda 
delineated three factors that might result if this were to happen. He alleged that there 
is a danger that this group of people will adopt political passions as they have the 
tendency to bring their political passions into their activities as intellectuals and 




The problem of social reproduction can be seen in a study conducted in 
Britain whereby those who held 100 of Britain's top positions were approached. 
However, contrary to the study conducted by George and Leow, it extended its study 
of the elites to include a selection of prominent figures from politics, business, 
government and the arts. Results revealed that Britain's top people overwhelmingly 
hold certain views in common. Those views remain conservative and they differ 
sharply from those of most of their fellow citizens (The Economist, 31 July 1993). 
 
If one were to argue through statistics as presented through Cherian George 
and Jason Leow or follow the arguments of the elites made by Peter Chen and Chan 
Heng Chee above, we might get the misleading impression that the Muslim elites in 
Singapore do not exert a significant influence in society. However, as we have seen 
in Chapter 2, even since the 1950s, in pre-independent Singapore, the Muslim elites 
have had a significant influence in charting the direction of their local Muslim 
community. Also, given the impact of global issues, coupled with old as well as new 
concerns shrouding the nation, as exhibited in Chapter 4, the state cannot but take 
the Muslim elites seriously. It is more than apparent from the previous chapters that 
the Muslim elites are not as powerless as they are perceived to be.  
 
It has to be emphasized that it is indeed misleading, when it comes to the 
Muslim elites, to only look at the political realm. To study the Muslim elites in 
Singapore, as mentioned in Chapter 3, one has to also take into consideration the 
religious and the social elites. We have to take into account the religious elites for the 
simple fact that Singapore Muslims are experiencing a significant increase in 
religiosity and the social elites because they are the mainstays in the local Muslim 
community in which many Muslim lives are affected by.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated how variations in the elite formation and 
functioning of the Muslim power elites have brought about certain political outcomes 
by looking at certain pertinent issues concerning the Muslim community these past 
few years. However what proves counter-intuitive is that despite Singapore’s political 
culture and the tenuous position of the Muslims manifest in the existence of the 
“Malay Problem”, the environment of distrust and even with the interdependence of 
the various elites, there can still emerge dissenting voices from amongst the Muslim 
elites. I have also shown that the structure of the social, religious and political elites 
not only impacts the Muslim community in Singapore, it reflects and captures the 
sentiments on the ground. 
 
The continuous portrayal of the Muslims as a monolithic category is both 
imposed upon the Muslims externally, as well as espoused by the Muslims 
themselves as seen by the fact that they feel the burden to consistently present 
themselves as a united people. This could be due to the constant reminding that as a 
minority, the Muslim community has to galvanize and mobilize along a strength-in-
numbers strategy. This is best expressed in an interview conducted with a member of 
the elite. When appealing to the masses to sign up as members in his organization, 
he said, “If I speak and behind me, there are a few hundred people, then no one will 
listen to me…. But if behind me, there are thousands then people will have to take 
notice”. In the final analysis, these attempts would not only be an exercise in futility 
as the community remains as a minority anyway, it would also cause an adverse 
effect on the Muslim community. Along with the issue of trust that continues to 
envelope the community, the Muslim elites in Singapore would continue to be in an 
uneasy position. 
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Due to the fact that Singapore is a young nation with a history of merely four 
decades, I was not able to examine the role of social inheritance amongst the power 
elites and the extent of which power elitism is transferable and can be socially 
reproduced amongst one’s circles. There are instances in some of the Muslim 
organizations whereby the sons of the Presidents have moved up to influential 
positions in the Board of Directors. However, this is still premature to make a case for 
social inheritance. Furthermore, a two-generational analysis emphasizing social 
reproduction lacks the necessary depth to make the study credible.  
 
A contribution of this thesis is that, it will enable other scholars and academics 
to make cross-comparative studies of the elites in Singapore across ethnic and 
religious lines. Given the peculiarities of the Muslim elites in Singapore, it will render 
a generalization and essentializing of elites in Singapore impossible. A cross-
comparative study will lead to a more holistic and comprehensive analysis of elites in 
Singapore. However, due to the restricted nature of the thesis, such a study is not 
possible here. 
 
This study which was embarked upon almost two years ago also have not 
incorporated the aftermath of the recent elections of 2006. Lee Kuan Yew claimed 
that in this election, support for the PAP teams from the Malays/Muslims were as 
high as 80% (Berita Harian 8 May 2006). Assuming that electoral votes are secret 
and confidential, this statement then needs to be examined further. Lee attributed this 
to the weak Malay/Muslim candidates that the oppositions fielded. It remains 
inconclusive whether the Muslims had voted for the PAP as a whole and whether this 
can be interpreted as a mandate of approval for the Muslim political elite. 
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The strength and cogency of the concept of the power elite lie in its tough-
minded “unmasking” of naive and taken for granted illusions about democratic checks 
on power. That is why, given the intensity whereby the political culture of Singapore 
is being debated, an understanding of the power elite can illuminate the kind of 
democracy that exists in this young nation-state. 
 
The situation with the Muslim power elites is multi-layered. While it is obvious 
that there exists a perpetual tension between the different groups of elites, fractions 
within the same group oppose each other as well. Each competing group tries to 
impose the legitimate principle of domination. Each fraction within the dominant class 
has its own world views and mode of living. This is the challenge of the elites - to 
ensure their perpetuation through overcoming crises that arise from factions 
competing to impose the dominant principle. The factions have different interests, 
careers and educational levels. Even those of the “same” educational level might be 
trained in different fields, for their academic backgrounds could vary from engineering 
to Islamic literature. Their conflicts represent attempts to secure and inculcate in the 
community the ''conversion rate'' for the type of capital with which each group is best 
provided. 
 
 The difficulty still remains. Whether the Muslim community will remain in its 
mechanical solidarity shell or whether it will integrate into the larger society is yet to 
be seen. The problem here is dual. One, the increasing religiosity of the community 
might strengthen the mechanical solidarity of the Muslims. Secondly, it is whether the 
state wants the Muslims to be integrated into the larger society. The ambivalent 
nature of the state towards the Muslim community is exemplified by the fact that at 
one level, it openly embraces the ideology of meritocracy, multiracialism and 
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multireligiosity but at another level the issue of trust and loyalty of the Muslim 
community is still a persistent feature of Singaporean life. The Muslim power elites 




Alatas, Syed Farid. 1997. Democracy and Authoritarianism in Indonesia and 
Malaysia: the Rise of the Post-Colonial State. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan; 
New York: St. Martin's Press.  
Alatas, Syed Hussein. 1972. "The Weber Thesis and Southeast Asia." Pp. 1-20 in 
Modernization and Social Change: Studies in Modernization, Religion, Social Change 
and Development in Southeast Asia. Sydney: Angus & Robertson. 
Andrews, John. 2002. The Economist: Pocket Asia. 7th ed. London: The Economist 
Newspaper Ltd and Profile Books Ltd. 
Barnard, Timothy P. 2004. Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity Across Boundaries. 
Singapore. Singapore University Press. 
Barr, Michael D. 2000. Lee Kuan Yew: the Beliefs Behind the Man. Richmond, 
Surrey: Curzon. 
Barton, Greg. 2005. Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia. Singapore: 
Ridge Books. 
Bauman, Z. 1997. Postmodernity and its Discontents. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Bottomore, Tom. 1964. Elites and Society. Middlesex. England: Pelican. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1989. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. 
London: Routledge. 
Bulst, Neithard. 1996. “Rulers, Representative Institutions and their Members as 
Power Elites: Rivals or Partners?” Pp 1-18 in Power Elites and State Building, edited 
by Reinhard Wolfgang. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Chan, Heng Chee. 1997. “Politics in an Administrative State: Where has the Politics 
gone?” Pp. 294-306 in Understanding Singapore Society. Singapore: Times 
Academic Press.  
Chen, Peter S.J. 1997. “The Power Elite in Singapore.” Pp. 7-16 in Understanding 
Singapore Society. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 
Chua, Beng-Huat. 1995. Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore. 
London; New York: Routledge. 
 102 
Clammer, John. 1991. The Sociology of Singapore Religion: Studies in Christianity 
and Chinese Culture. Singapore: Chopmen Publishers. 
Crichton, Michael. 2004. State of Fear: A Novel. New York: HarperCollins. 
Emile, Durkheim. 1933. The Division of Labour in Society, translated by George 
Simpson. New York: Free Press. 
Emile, Durkheim. 1938. The Rules of Sociological Method, 8th ed., translated by 
Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller and edited by George E. G. Catlin. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
Emile, Durkheim. 1951. Suicide, a Study in Sociology, 3rd ed., translated by John A. 
Spaulding and George Simpson. Glencoe, New York: Free Press. 
Emile, Durkheim. 1956. Education and Sociology, 3rd ed., translated by Sherwood D. 
Fox. Glencoe, New York: Free Press. 
Emile, Durkheim. 1973. “The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions.” 
Pp 149-163 in On Morality and Society, edited by Robert N. Bellah, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Emile, Durkheim. 1982. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, 2nd ed., 
translated by Joseph Ward Swain. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Evans, Grant. 1986. From Moral Economy to Remembered Village: the Sociology of 
James C. Scott. Clayton, Vic.: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash 
University. 
Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972-1977. Edited by Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Furedi, Frank. 1997. Culture of Fear: Risk Taking and the Morality of Low 
Expectation. London; Washington: Cassell. 
Furedi, Frank. 2005. Politics of Fear: Beyond Left and Right. London: Continuum 
Press. 
Glassner, Barry. 1999. The Culture of Fear: Why Americans are Afraid of the Wrong 
Things. New York: Basic Books. 
Gomes, Aberto. 1994. Modernity and Identity: Asian Illustrations. Bundoora. La Trobe 
University Press. 
 103 
Hefner, Robert W. 1998. Market Cultures: Society and Morality in the New Asian 
Capitalisms. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press. 
Hefner, Robert W. 2001. The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in 
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
Hefner, Robert W. 2004. “Shariah Formalism or Democratic Communitarianism?” in 
Communitarian Politics in Asia, edited by Chua Beng Huat. London; New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Herman, Edward S. & Noam Chomsky. 1988. Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media. 1st ed. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Hill, Michael. 2001. The Elite-Sponsored Moral Panic: a Singapore Perspective. 
Singapore: Centre for Advanced Studies, National University of Singapore. 
Hussin Mutalib. 1990. Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics. Singapore: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hussin Mutalib. 2003. Parties and Politics: A Study of Opposition Parties and the 
PAP in Singapore. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press. 
Ismail Ibrahim and Elinah Abdullah. 2000. “The Singapore Malay/Muslim Community: 
Civic Traditions in a Multiracial and Multicultural Society.” Pp. 50-60 in State-society 
Relations in Singapore, edited by Gillian Koh and Ooi Giok-Ling. Singapore: Institute 
of Policy Studies; Oxford University Press. 
Ismail Kassim. 1974. Problems of Elite Cohesion: a Perspective from a Minority 
Community. Singapore: Singapore University Press. 
Robert Jackall. 1988. Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Jones, Catherine. 1993. “The Pacific Challenge: Confucian Welfare States.” Pp.198-
217 in New Perspectives on the Welfare States in Europe, edited by Catherine 
Jones. London: Routledge. 
Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1995. New Social Movements in Western Europe. London: 
University College London Press. 
Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1996. “The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in 
a Political Context” in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, edited by 
Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 104 
Li, Tania. 1989. Malays in Singapore: Culture, Economy, and Ideology. Singapore: 
Oxford University Press. 
Li, Tania. 1998. “Constituting Capitalist Culture: the Singapore Malay Problem and 
Entrepreneurship Reconsidered.” Pp. 147-172 in Market Cultures: Society and  
Lily Zubaidah Rahim. 1998. The Singapore Dilemma: the Political and Educational 
Marginality of the Malay Community. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 
Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1947. The Prince. New York. F.S. Crofts and Company. 
Mauzy, Diane K. and R.S. Milne. 2002. Singapore Politics under the People's Action 
Party. London: Routledge. 
Meisel, James. 1958. The Myth of the Ruling Class; Gaetano Mosca and the “Elite”. 
Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. 
Mills, C Wright. 1959. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Moderation in Islam: In the Context of Muslim Community in Singapore. 2004. 
Singapore: PERGAS. 
Mohammed M. Hafez. 2003. Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the 
Islamic World. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Mohd Aris Hj Othman. 1983. The Dynamics of Malay identity. Malaysia. Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia.   
Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman and Lai Ah Eng, eds. 2006. Secularism and Spirituality: 
Seeking Integrated Knowledge and Success in Madrasah Education in Singapore. 
Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies: Marshall Cavendish Academic. 
Ottaway, Marina. 2003. Democracy Challenged: the Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism. 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington, D.C. 
Pang, Eng Fong. 1982. Education, Manpower and Development in Singapore. 
Singapore: Singapore University Press. 
Pareto, Vilfredo, 1935. The Mind and Society (Tratto Di Sociologia Generale), edited 
by Arthur Livingston. London: Jonathan Cape. 
Purushotam, Nirmala. 1998. Negotiating Language, Constructing Race: Disciplining 
Difference in Singapore. New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
 105 
Quah, Jon S.T. 2003. Curbing Corruption in Asia: A Comparative Study of Six 
Countries. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press. 
Quah, Jon S.T., Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, eds. 1985. Government 
and Politics of Singapore. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 
Russell, Bertrand. 1975. Power: a New Social Analysis. London: George Allen & 
Unwin. 
Scott, James C. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant 
Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Sulaiman Jeem and Abdul Ghani Hamid. 1997. Aktivis Melayu/Islam di Singapura. 
Singapore: Persatuan Wartawan Melayu Singapura. 
Tamney, Joseph B. 1996. The Struggle over Singapore's Soul: Western 
Modernization and Asian Culture. New York: Walter de Gruyter.  
Tan, Eugene K B. 2004. “We the Citizens of Singapore…Multiethnicity, its Evolution 
and its Aberrations” pp. 65-97 in Beyond Rituals and Riots: Ethnic Pluralism and 
Social Cohesion in Singapore, edited by Lai Ah Eng. Singapore: Eastern Universities 
Press. 
Tan, Kevin Y L. 2004. “The Legal and Institutional Framework and Issues of 
Multiculturalism in Singapore” pp. 98-113 in Beyond Rituals and Riots: Ethnic 
Pluralism and Social Cohesion in Singapore, edited by Lai Ah Eng. Singapore: 
Eastern Universities Press. 
Tham, Seong Chee. 1977. Malays and Modernization: A Sociological Interpretation. 
Singapore:  Singapore University Press. 
 
Toh, Mun Heng and Tan Kong Yam, eds. 1998. Competitiveness of the Singapore 
Economy: a Strategic Perspective. Singapore: Singapore University Press: World 
Scientific. 
Tong, Chee Kiong and Lian Kwen Fee, eds. 2002. The Making of Singapore 
Sociology. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 
Tremewan, Christopher. 1994. The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore. 
New York: St. Martin's Press; Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan. 
Turner, Bryan S. 1998. Weber and Islam. London; New York: Routledge. 
Vasil, Raj. 2000. Governing Singapore: Democracy and National Development. 
Singapore: Allen & Unwin. 
 106 
Vasil, Raj. 2004. A Citizen's Guide to Government and Politics in Singapore. 
Singapore: Talisman Publishing.  
Wan Hussin Zoohri. 1990. The Singapore Malays: the Dilemma of Development. 
Singapore: Kesatuan Guru-guru Melayu Singapura. 
Wolfgang, Reinhard. 1996. “Power Elites, State Servants, Ruling Classes, and the 
Growth of State Power” in Power Elites and State Building. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Worthington, Ross. 2003. Governance in Singapore. London: Routledge Curzon. 
Zuraidah Ibrahim. 1994. Muslims in Singapore: A Shared Vision. Singapore: Times 
Editions. 
Zuraidah Ibrahim. 1999. “The Malay Mobilisers: Ahmad Ibrahim, Othman Wok, 
Yaacob Mohamed & Rahim Ishak” in Lee's Lieutenants: Singapore's Old Guard, 
edited by Lam Peng Er and Kevin Y.L. Tan. St Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin. 
Journals 
Barr, Michael D. and Low, Jevon. “Assimilation as Multiracialism: The case of 
Singapore's Malays.” Asian Ethnicity 6(3):161-182. 
Bell, Daniel. 1958. “The Power Elite-Reconsidered.” The American Journal of 
Sociology 64:238-250. 
Chan, Heng Chee. 1976. “The Role of Parliamentary Politicians in Singapore.” 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 1:423-441. 
Chan, J S. 2000. “Singapore: A Vision for the New Millenium”. in Southeast Asian 
Affairs. Singapore. Pp 259-75. 
Chua, Beng-Huat. 1991. “Singapore 1990: Celebrating the End of an Era.” in 
Southeast Asian Affairs. Singapore. Pp. 253-266. 
Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. “Asia’s Soft-Authoritarian Alternative.” New Perspectives 
Quarterly 9(2):60-61. 
Hussin Mutalib. 2005. “Singapore Muslims: The Quest for Identity in a Modern City-
State”. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 25(1):53-72. 
 
Rossi, Peter H. 1956. Review of “The Power Elite by C Wright Mills.” The American 
Journal of Sociology 62(2):232. 
Roy, Denny. 1994. “Singapore, China and the Soft Authoritarian Challenge.” Asian 
Survey 34(3):231-242. 
 107 
Tae Yul Nam. 1970. “Singapore's One-Party System: Its Relationship to Democracy 
and Political Stability.” Pacific Affairs 42:465-480. 
Tan, Kenneth Paul. 2003. “Crisis, Self-Reflection, and Rebirth in Singapore’s National 
Life Cycle.” in Southeast Asian Affairs. Singapore. Pp. 241-258. 
Government Publications 
Census of Population 2000 - Demographic characteristics, compiled by Geok Leow 
Bee. Singapore: Dept. of Statistics, 2001. 
Ministry of Education Annual Report 1949-1962 (Singapore: Singapore Government 
Printers, 1949-1963). 
 
White Paper. 2003. The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism. 
Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs. 
Magazine / Newspaper Articles 
Berita Harian 
Gomez, James (ed.) 2001. Publish and Perish: the Censorship of Opposition Party 
Publications in Singapore. Singapore: National Solidarity Party. 
Religions in Singapore. 2002. 3rd ed. Singapore: Inter-Religious Organisation. 
The Economist 
The Straits Times 
Unpublished Dissertation / Others  
Cooper, S. 2004.  “The Ideas of Ludwik Fleck and Their Application to the Eukaryotic 
Cell Cycle, the Restriction Point, and G1-phase Control”. University of Michigan 
Medical School. 
Habibullah Khan. 2001. “Social Policy in Singapore: A Confucian Model?” World 
Bank Institute Working Paper. Washington, D.C. 
Kamaroonnisa Mohamed. 1994. “Association of Muslim Professionals: Origins & Role 
in the Development of the Malay/Muslim Community”, Research exercise, 
Department of Malay Studies, Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences, National University 
of Singapore. 
Lau, Teik Soon. 1974. “Majority-Minority Situation Singapore.” Occasional Paper 
No.7. Dept of Political Science, National University Singapore. 
 108 
Olcott, Martha Brill and Marina Ottaway. 1999. “The Challenge of Semi-
Authoritarianism.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington, D.C. 
Pung, Lynden H. S.  1993. The Malays in Singapore: Political Aspects of the "Malay 
Problem". Academic Exercise, McMaster University. 
Mazreeta Sirat. 1997. Malay Identity in Singapore: The Perception of Malay Youths 
regarding their identity. Research exercise, Department of Malay Studies, Faculty of 
Arts & Social Sciences, National University of Singapore. 
Stimpfl, Joseph Richard. 1991. “Who Shall We Be?: Constructing Malay Identity in a 
Singapore Secondary School.” PhD Thesis. University of Pittsburgh. 
Sukmawati bte Haji Sirat. 1995. Trends in Malay Political Leadership: the People's 
Action Party's Malay Political Leaders and the Integration of the Singapore Malays. 
PhD Thesis. University of South Carolina. 
